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INTRODUCTION
End-user license agreements are ubiquitous. Almost every time one acquires soft-
ware, digital media content, or software-embedded goods, such as digital cameras, 
new appliances, or even new cars, one receives a license agreement (often abbrevi-
ated “EULA”) alongside the purchase that purports to specify how the software or 
digital work may be used. These licenses indicate how the licensee may use the ac-
quired product—often by limiting how or whether the product may be transferred,1
                                                                                                                
?. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to Miriam Baer, Chris Beauchamp, 
Emily Grothoff, Brian Lee, Jeremy Sheff, Eva Subotnik, the members of the St. John’s 
University Intellectual Property Law Colloquium, the attendees of the 2017 Intellectual Property 
Scholars Conference, and the faculty of Brooklyn Law School for their helpful comments. 
1. E.g., Kindle Store Terms of Use, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help 
/customer/display.html?nodeId=201014950 [https://perma.cc/34A6-E3F9] (last updated Oct. 
5, 2016) (specifying in “1. Kindle Content” that the digital content purchased for use on an 
Amazon Kindle is “solely for your personal, non-commercial use” and that an end user “may 
not sell, rent, lease, distribute, broadcast, sublicense, or otherwise assign any rights to the 
Kindle Content”).
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whether it can be used for commercial purposes,2 or whether additional copies of the 
software can be made.3 Some licenses have gone beyond these somewhat straight-
forward terms to include more particular limitations. For example, the John Deere 
company believes (relying on both its EULA and the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act) that it should have the power to specify who may repair broken vehicles manu-
factured and sold by Deere,4 and the license agreement that governs World of 
Warcraft players specifies that users do not have a license to access the game’s cop-
yrighted content if they are using an automated system to play.5
Yet even though licenses are omnipresent, their legal character remains disputed 
and poorly defined. On the one hand, EULAs look like contracts, and contracting 
parties are generally allowed to make highly idiosyncratic agreements of almost un-
limited variation.6 On the other hand, most licenses also appear to be documents that 
                                                                                                                
2. E.g., Microsoft Software License Terms, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en 
-us/useterms [https://perma.cc/4TWH-NDVU] (Select from drop-down menus: “From a store 
as packaged . . . ,” “Word,” “2013,” and “English”; hit “Go”; then open the pdf titled 
“Word_2013_English.pdf”) (stating in “H. Home and Student Software,” “‘Home and 
Student’ edition software may not be used for commercial, non-profit, or revenue-generating 
activities.”).
3. E.g., Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, APPLE, http://www.apple.com 
/legal/internet-services/itunes/us/terms.html [https://perma.cc/97MC-NSAS] (last updated 
Sept. 13, 2016) (specifying in “B. Using Our Services” that a user may “burn an audio playlist
to CD for listening purposes up to seven times”).  
4. See Jason Bloomberg, John Deere’s Digital Transformation Runs Afoul of Right-To-
Repair Movement, FORBES (April 30, 2017, 12:03 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites 
/jasonbloomberg/2017/04/30/john-deeres-digital-transformation-runs-afoul-of-right-to-repair-
movement/#598b6a2d5ab9 [https://perma.cc/C43U-7NR7] (“Subsequent to the US Copyright 
Office’s Class 21 exemption, then, John Deere required its customers to sign an updated 
EULA that restricted the ability of equipment owners to repair or modify their equipment, in 
essence requiring them to use John Deere-certified diagnostic and repair software – software 
that some farmers claim the company has not made available to them.”); Laura Sydell, DIY 
Tractor Repair Runs Afoul of Copyright Law, NPR (Aug. 17, 2015, 4:20 PM), http:// 
www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2015/08/17/432601480/diy-tractor-repair-runs-afoul-
of-copyright-law [https://perma.cc/5M73-SAM7] (“Unfortunately, Alford isn't allowed to fix 
[his tractor]. . . . If something goes wrong with one of his tractors Alford has to take it to an 
authorized John Deere dealer—the closest one is about 40 miles away—or a John Deere rep 
has to come visit him.”); Kit Walsh, John Deere Really Doesn’t Want You To Own that 
Tractor, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks 
/2016/12/john-deere-really-doesnt-want-you-own-tractor [https://perma.cc/5PRN-WM6R] 
(“In the new License Agreement for John Deere Embedded Software, customers are forbidden 
to exercise their repair rights or to even look at the software running the tractor or the signals 
it generates.”).
5. See World of Warcraft Terms of Use, BLIZZARD, http://us.blizzard.com/en 
-us/company/legal/wow_tou.html [https://perma.cc/S65N-LXX7] (last updated Aug. 22, 
2012) (stating in “2. Additional License Limitations,” “Any use of the Service or the Game 
Client in violation of the License Limitations will be regarded as an infringement of Blizzard’s 
copyrights in and to the Game. You agree that you will not . . . use cheats, automation software 
(bots), hacks, mods or any other unauthorized third-party software designed to modify the 
World of Warcraft experience.”).
6. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
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transfer property rights—the rights to make certain uses of copyrighted and patented 
works—and property rights have historically been more limited in how they can be 
transferred.7 In particular, physical goods typically cannot be “licensed” indefinitely 
to end users.8
Because EULAs appear to have characteristics of contracts and of instruments 
that transfer property, lawyers, judges, and legislators can unconsciously find them-
selves switching between intuitions that EULAs should be treated as one or the other. 
These same actors can also opportunistically choose to treat licenses as creatures of 
property or contract based on their preferred outcomes. 
By unconsciously applying varying principles to EULAs, or by opportunistically 
choosing how to interpret them, legal actors risk developing harmful or internally 
inconsistent licensing law. But this risk can be diminished if we instead choose to 
develop EULA law intentionally, using insights about property and contract law to 
help illuminate when EULAs should be regulated as contracts, as property transfers, 
or in a sui generis way. 
Accordingly, this Article argues that EULAs are best understood, to use the ter-
minology of Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith,9 as existing on “the property/contract 
interface.”10 EULAs blend qualities classically associated with property and con-
tracts, and the ways in which they are property-like and contract-like inform what 
legal treatment will make them most effective and beneficial. Contract law typically 
covers “in personam” relationships among rights holders and duty holders, in which 
a single, identifiable person has rights against or is owed a duty from another identi-
fiable person.11 This relationship plainly exists in the traditional contract setting, 
where two people come together and write out an agreement between themselves. In 
such a scenario, the number of people involved in the legal relationship is limited to 
a small number, and all are known to each other. In contrast, property law typically 
covers what have been described as “in rem” relationships, where a single person 
holds rights against or is owed duties from many, unidentified people.12 In rem rights 
and duties typically attach to individuals through their relationship with a particular 
                                                                                                                
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2000) (“The law of contract 
recognizes no inherent limitations on the nature or the duration of the interests that can be the 
subject of a legally binding contract. . . . [O]utside . . . relatively narrow areas of proscription 
and requirements . . . there is a potentially infinite range of promises that the law will honor. 
The parties to a contract are free to be as whimsical or fanciful as they like in describing the 
promise to be performed, the consideration to be given in return for the promise, and the du-
ration of the agreement.”).
7. Id. (“Generally speaking, the law will enforce as property only those interests that 
conform to a limited number of standard forms. . . . If [parties] fail to be clear about which 
legal interest they are conveying, or if they attempt to customize a new type of interest, the 
courts will generally recast the conveyance as creating one of the recognized forms.”).
8. See Christina Mulligan, Personal Property Servitudes on the Internet of Things, 50 
GA. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (2016). 
9. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 773 (2001).  
10. Id. at 773. 
11. Id. at 809. 
12. Id.  
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thing, which may be physical (a car) or nonphysical (a bank account or a poem).13
An example of this situation is simple ownership of physical property. If someone 
owns a car, everyone else has a duty not to trespass on it, commandeer it, or destroy 
it. Although nearly everyone has a duty to abstain from interacting with the car, the 
car’s owner can’t name everyone bound by the duty. In general, intellectual property 
law also protects what can be described as “in rem rights,” because everyone has a 
duty to abstain from infringing behavior.14  
EULAs create rights and duties that are neither purely in rem nor purely in perso-
nam. As in an “in rem” relationship, many people (the licensees) can have obligations 
to a single licensor under the EULA. But as in an “in personam” relationship, the 
duty holders are (or could be) known to the licensor. Merrill and Smith call this type 
of hybrid relationship “compound-paucital” and define it as when “a single identified 
person has rights against or is owed duties by a large number of identified persons.”15
Compound-paucital relationships are like in personam ones, because the relevant 
parties are known to each other, but they also resemble in rem relationships because 
very large numbers of people owe duties to a single rights holder. One example of 
the compound-paucital relationship is that of a bailee who engages in transactions 
with many bailors, such as a coat check or a valet parking agent.16 Another example 
would be standard-form leases offered to tenants by the landlord of a large apartment 
building.17 Although compound-paucital relationships tend to involve the agreement 
of all parties, as do contracts, the terms of those relationships are not alterable by the 
numerous parties on one side of the transaction. Rather, as is the case with in rem 
property rights, a combination of immutable and default legal rules and the decisions 
of the single rights-holding party determine what rights and obligations are created 
and enforced. 
In compound-paucital relationships, the single rights holder has tremendous cause 
to establish relationships that benefit its own interests, because those benefits will 
aggregate over the numerous parties on the other side of the relationship.18
Correspondingly, the numerous duty holders individually have less at stake. As a 
result of this asymmetry, Merrill and Smith anticipated that legal areas involving 
compound-paucital relationships would develop strategies to protect the numerous 
                                                                                                                
13. See id. at 783. 
14. See Christina Mulligan, A Numerus Clausus Principle for Intellectual Property, 80
TENN. L. REV. 235, 247–48 n.65 (2013). 
15. Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 809. The term “compound-paucital” is derived from 
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s use of the word “paucital” to describe in personam rights. 
Hohfeld defined a paucital right as “a unique right residing in a person (or group of persons) 
and availing against a single person (or single group of persons); or else it is one of the few
fundamentally similar, yet separate, rights availing respectively against a few definite per-
sons.” Id. at 782 (emphasis in original) (quoting WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 
AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 65, 72 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., Greenwood Press 
1978)). 
16. Id. at 814. See generally Christopher M. Newman, Bailment and the 
Property/Contract Interface (George Mason Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper 
No. LS 15-12), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2654988 [https://perma.cc/2JMR-CGDR].
17. Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 825–26. 
18. Id. at 804–05.
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parties.19 While contract law presumes that contracting parties are generally able to 
advocate for their own interests, Merrill and Smith recognize that the compound-
paucital relationship inherently creates opportunities for the single rights holder to 
take advantage of the comparatively weaker duty holders, who are not in a position 
to negotiate the terms of their relationship.20  
Yet the evolution of the law of EULAs—and of contracts of adhesion more gen-
erally—has been anything but protective of licensees’ interests. Indeed, EULAs are 
usually read to give their drafters wide discretion over the content of the license 
agreements.21
This Article investigates the nature of compound-paucital relationships and eval-
uates how particular types of terms in EULAs ought to be regulated in their light. By 
clearly and precisely conceptualizing how EULAs affect end users’ rights and duties, 
we can develop a law of licenses that is internally consistent, economically efficient, 
and socially beneficial.  
Part I of this Article makes the case that distinguishing between contract and 
property rights is not merely a formal exercise but is of practical importance. Part II
explores the nature of compound-paucital relationships and evaluates how the law 
should approach regulating EULAs in light of their compound-paucital nature. Parts 
III and IV apply these insights to EULAs that limit how end users use and transfer 
rights to particular copies and to EULAs that allow licensors to revoke their licenses. 
Part VI concludes. 
I. THE ROLE OF FORMAL CATEGORIES
What difference does it make whether the legal relationships created by EULAs 
are contract-like or property-like? Particularly in light of the popular framing of prop-
erty as a “bundle of sticks,”22 the exercise of separating legal relationships into for-
mal types seems increasingly outmoded. Formal categories are indeed not valuable 
                                                                                                                
19. Id. at 805–06 (describing the protection strategy and stating “[w]e would expect 
compound-paucital situations to tend in the direction of the protection strategy”). 
20. Id. at 804–05.
21. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The God Paradox, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1017, 1047 (2009) 
(“EULAs are enforceable unless unconscionable.”); see also Lydia Pallas Loren, Slaying the 
Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: Reforming Copyright Owner Contracting with 
Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 495, 508–10 (2004) (discussing how the doctrine of 
unconscionability would function in the context of shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses); 
Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2003) (“If the non-drafting party [of a boilerplate contract] indi-
cates his general assent to the form, courts will enforce the terms contained therein whether or 
not that party approves of the terms provided, understands those terms, has read them, or even 
has the vaguest idea what the terms might be about. Limited exceptions are made to this rule, 
most notably if the terms are found to be ‘unconscionable.’”).
22. J.E. Penner summarizes the “bundle of sticks” view: 
In its conventional formulation, the bundle of rights thesis is a combination of 
Wesley Hohfeld’s analysis of rights and A.M. Honoré’s description of the inci-
dents of ownership. According to Hohfeld, any right in rem should be regarded 
as a myriad of personal rights between individuals. Thus my ownership of a car 
should not be regarded as a legal relation between me and a thing, the car, but as 
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in and of themselves, but deciding whether to understand licenses as creatures on the 
property/contract interface has several practical implications. While it may be possi-
ble to decide how to apply and regulate EULAs without talking about contracts and 
property, or rights and duties, doing so helps crystalize the implications of each 
choice about what rights and obligations EULAs can and should create. 
First, the question of whether to understand violations of EULA terms as breaches 
of contract or as infringements of intellectual property rights directly impacts what 
remedies are available to wronged parties. At the most practical level, whether some-
one has breached a contract or violated someone’s physical or intellectual property 
rights has significant consequences for what remedies are available to the person 
whose interests were violated. The nonbreaching party in a contract typically is en-
titled to the “benefit of [the] bargain”—to be placed in as good a position as they 
would have been in if the contract had not been violated.23 On the other hand, the 
violation of a property interest may result in damages that exceed the monetary harm 
caused to the aggrieved party,24 or to nonmonetary remedies such as injunctions or 
                                                                                                                
a series of rights I hold against all others, each of whom has a correlative duty 
not to interfere with my ownership of the car, by damaging it, or stealing it, and 
so on. Any standard right in property is properly treated as a bundle of rights the 
owner holds against many others. Furthermore, the substance of the property 
right itself is subject to fractionation. . . . Hohfeld’s model is complemented by 
the list of the “incidents” of ownership described by Honoré in his landmark pa-
per Ownership, which outlines in some detail the right to possess, the right to 
use, the right to capital, the liability to execution, the immunity from expropria-
tion, and so on. 
J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712–13 
(1996) (discussing HOHFIELD, supra note 15, at 67, and A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD 
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (FIRST SERIES) 107, 112–24 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961)). Penner goes 
on to observe that “[t]he prevalence of the [bundle of rights] paradigm is undeniable” while 
also criticizing it as “little more than a slogan. . . . , which does not represent any clear thesis 
or set of propositions.” Id. at 713–14. For further discussions of the “bundle of rights” or 
“bundle of sticks” view, see LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS 11–21 (1977); JOHN 
CHRISTMAN, THE MYTH OF PROPERTY 3–27 (1994); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF 
PROPERTY 22–36 (1990); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 47–53, 59–60
(1988); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, 22 NOMOS 69, 69 (1980). 
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. a (“Contract damages are or-
dinarily based on the injured party’s expectation interest and are intended to give him the 
benefit of his bargain by awarding him a sum of money that will, to the extent possible, put 
him in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed.”); 24 
SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 64:1 (4th ed. 
2002) (“The fundamental principle that underlies the availability of contract damages is that 
of compensation. That is, the disappointed promisee is generally entitled to an award of money 
damages in an amount reasonably calculated to make him or her whole and neither more nor 
less; any greater sum operates to punish the breaching promisor and results in an unwarranted 
windfall to the promisee, while any lesser sum rewards the promisor for his or her wrongful 
act in breaching the contract and fails to provide the promisee with the benefit of the bargain 
he or she made.”).
24. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Wis. 1997) (“[I]n certain 
situations of trespass, the actual harm is not in the damage done to the land, which may be 
minimal, but in the loss of the individual’s right to exclude others from his or her property 
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restitution.25 Violators of a copyright holder’s exclusive rights can be liable for up to 
$150,000 in statutory damages for willful infringement, even when the actual mone-
tary harm to the copyright holder is quite low.26
Second, the question of who has title to particular copies of works resolves other 
questions about who has the authority to take various actions with regard to copies, 
which may not be specified explicitly in a EULA or other document which transfers 
title. Consider the case of a EULA for an internet-connected device that includes the 
frequently seen statement, “this software is licensed and not sold to you.” One could 
take the perspective that title to the software remained with the licensor (as the agree-
ment indicates). In this case, attempts to transfer the device and its software to a third 
party would fail: the party transferring the device would violate the copyright 
holder’s exclusive right to distribute the work,27 and under one popular theory, future 
users of the device would also be violating the copyright holder’s exclusive right to 
reproduce the work by running the software.28 On the other hand, one could ignore 
                                                                                                                
and, the court implied that this right may be punished by a large damage award despite the 
lack of measurable harm.”).
25. Restitution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“3. Return or restoration of 
some specific thing to its rightful owner or status.”).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). See generally Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, 
Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
439 (2009) (discussing the history of statutory damages in copyright law and suggesting re-
forms). 
27. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012).  
28. In 1993, a Ninth Circuit decision, MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., held 
that, because running a program created a temporary copy in a computer’s Random Access 
Memory (RAM), running a software program constituted prima facie copyright infringement 
of a copyright owner’s exclusive right to reproduce a copyrighted work. 991 F.2d 511, 518 
(9th Cir. 1993); see also JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 92 (Mich. Publ’g 2017) (“For 
all works encoded in digital form, any act of reading or viewing the work would require the 
use of a computer . . . and would, under this interpretation, involve an actionable reproduc-
tion.”). Although MAI Systems was initially controversial, two years later President Bill 
Clinton’s Working Group on Intellectual Property released a White Paper expressing the view 
that MAI Systems was a correctly decided and routine application of the law. LITMAN, supra,
94–95. The White Paper concluded that any use of a digital work constituted a prima facie 
copyright infringement because any copy of a work loaded into a computer’s RAM constituted 
an actionable copy under the copyright statute. See Information Infrastructure Task Force, 
Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: The Report of the Working 
Group on Intellectual Property Rights 65–66 (1995) [hereinafter White Paper]. As a result, 
the White Paper argued copyright owners had the right to control whether and how someone 
read, listened to, or viewed a digital work, even though the copyright statute did not allow 
copyright holders to exert the same control over the use of non-digital works. LITMAN, supra,
at 94–95 (citing White Paper, supra, at 19–130). The prevailing interpretation of MAI Systems 
has, however, been called into question. In 2008, the Second Circuit held that while “loading 
a program into a computer’s RAM can result in copying that program,” it did not read MAI 
Systems as holding that, as a matter of law, “loading a program into a form of RAM always
results in copying.” Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 128 (2d. Cir. 
2008). Cartoon Network emphasized that a copy still needed to be fixed for longer than a 
“transitory duration” to qualify as a potentially infringing copy under 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
Id. at 128–30. For an alternate theory of how digital copies should be treated under copyright 
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the text of the license, and treat the transaction as having sold a copy of the work to 
the end user while also requiring the end user to agree to a set of contractual terms 
about how they would use the work. In the latter case, reselling the device (along 
with its embedded software) would be legally effective; the end user would have had 
title to a copy of the software, and therefore could transfer it under the first sale doc-
trine.29 However, if the end user had agreed not to transfer ownership of the software 
to a second-hand user, then a court might understand the transfer as violating a con-
tract between the end user and the copyright holder, leading to contract damages. 
There are other possibilities as well, but in any case, the underlying question of who 
owns the copy of the licensed work plays a significant role in determining the out-
come.  
Third, understanding whether EULAs have contract-like or property-like charac-
teristics will guide us towards learning what kind of regulation will allow EULAs to 
effectively and fairly delineate rights among licensors and licensees, based on what 
we know facilitates functionality and fairness in contracts and property. Concepts 
and values that historically animated contract and property law provide tools to eval-
uate whether end-user license agreements achieve the ends they seek or promote gen-
eral social and economic well-being. As Julie Cohen argues, rather than focusing on 
the question of “what is property,” lawyers and commentators should focus on the 
more practical questions of whether laws governing resource management succeed, 
regardless of what the resource in question is.30 Similarly, Merrill and Smith argue 
that understanding whether something is property-like or contract-like is helpful be-
cause the nature of the legal relationships at stake inform what kind of regulation will 
make those relationships succeed or fail.31 Even when legal topics are not classic 
examples of property or contract,32 we can still learn about them through reference 
to traditional property and contract law concepts. When a resource, here digital as-
sets, shares some characteristics with the historic objects of contract or physical prop-
erty law, it can be advantageous to reason by analogy and conclude what worked for 
one body of law will also work well for another one with which it shares key char-
acteristics.33  
But beyond the direct implications of property and contract law, looking at legal 
issues through the lens of property and contract law can also be useful to guide and 
explain how the law has developed so far, and why it has. Both the words “property” 
                                                                                                                
law, see Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1067 (2010). 
29. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).  
30. Julie E. Cohen, Property as Institutions for Resources: Lessons from and for IP, 94 
TEX. L. REV. 1, 20 (2015) (“[M]y aim . . . is not theoretical purity, but rather usefulness. 
Simply put, a theory of property as family resemblances provides a more useful foundation 
for understanding the types of rules and institutions through which existing systems of prop-
erty perform their resource-coordination functions.”); id. at 32 (“Property rights are bundles 
of attributes constructed and assembled for particular purposes, and as such they exhibit sys-
tematic patterns. It seems most sensible to understand ‘property’ as an umbrella term covering 
a set of institutional choices that are related by an emphasis on exclusivity and exchange.”).
31. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 790–92. 
32. “No litmus test can separate the rights of property from, say, those of contract in all 
cases.” MUNZER, supra note 22, at 24. 
33. Christina Mulligan, The Story of Land, 95 TEX. L. REV. 12 (2016).  
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and “contract” evoke particular ideas, values, and general rules of thumb among 
those educated in the common-law tradition. The idea of property may evoke 
Blackstone’s often-quoted characterization of property as the “sole and despotic do-
minion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in 
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”34 Others hear the 
word “property” and reject Blackstone’s view (or, perhaps more accurately stated, 
this “hyperbolic” portrayal of Blackstone’s view)35 in favor of the sense that property 
is a “bundle of sticks” that can be dis- and reaggregated in a variety of ways.36
Similarly, the idea of “contract” makes many think of “freedom of contract”37—and 
an intuition that people should be able to commit to anything they voluntarily agree 
to.38 For others, this question of voluntariness immediately evokes concerns about 
                                                                                                                
34. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
35. Per Robert Ellickson, Blackstone “would have admitted that his sentence . . . was hy-
perbolic. His treatise explicitly discussed, for example, a variety of legal privileges to enter 
private land without the owner’s consent.” Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE 
L.J. 1315, 1362 n.237 (1993); see also Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Debunking Blackstonian 
Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 1126, 1133 (2009) (“By most accounts, when Blackstone defined 
property as the sole and despotic dominion of its owners, he was far from advocating a form 
of property absolutism. As legal historians have pointed out, Blackstone’s own description of 
property doctrine of the time did not reflect this definition. Yet ironically, the Blackstonian 
idea of property is commonly associated with his definition, rather than his actual description 
of the subject.”); cf. Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through A Property 
Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 52–82 (2004) (exploring longstanding limitations on owner's rights 
in property law); Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New 
Frontiers, 76 IND. L.J. 803, 805 (2001) (“[T]o look closely at all the forms of property that 
have existed even before reaching intellectual property is to realize that Blackstone engaged 
in injudicious overgeneralization . . . .”). But even as there is widespread agreement that 
Blackstone was speaking hyperbolically, Blackstone does not appear to have embraced a 
proto-“bundle of sticks” view of property either. Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting 
the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 397–401 (2003) (“[I]t is anachronistic to 
impose this twentieth-century conception of property [as a bundle of sticks] upon Blackstone’s
work”); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 361 (2001) (“Blackstone’s talk about property being a ‘sole 
and despotic dominion’ was clearly a bit of hyperbole and is inconsistent with the balance of 
his treatment of property, not to mention with the complexities of modern property law. But 
the hyperbole should not obscure the fact that, at bottom, Blackstone conceived of property as 
being a right in rem.”).
36. See supra note 22. 
37. “The conventional account of American contract law traces the course of freedom of 
contract from triumph to decline to ultimate restoration. . . . Freedom of contract has gone in 
and out of fashion over time, and today it stands as a fundamental tenet of our jurisprudence.” 
Mark L. Movsesian, Two Cheers for Freedom of Contract, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1529, 1545 
(2002) (reviewing THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (F.H. Buckley ed. 1999)). 
38. “Once, they say, freedom of contract reigned in American law. Parties could make 
agreements on a wide variety of subjects and choose the terms they wished. Courts would 
refrain from questioning the substance of bargains and would ensure only that parties had 
observed the proper formalities.” Id. at 1529 (citing W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES
12–16 (1996); GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 15 (1974); Friedrich Kessler, 
Introduction: Contract as a Principle of Order, in FRIEDRICH KESSLER, GRANT GILMORE &
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power relationships and the circumstances under which individuals genuinely make 
choices freely.39 But regardless of whether one hears “property” and “contract” and 
thinks of Blackstone,40 Lochner v. New York,41 Hohfeld,42 or anything else, the no-
tions of “property” and “contract” tend to carry powerful (if sometimes conflicting) 
associations for lawyers, jurists, and legal thinkers. If licensing software is described 
as a transfer of property rights or as making a contract, that manner of talking about 
the use fuels one’s intuitions about the legal consequences of that use and of violating 
the terms of it. And because the tendency to fall back on ideas like property and 
contract inspires lawyers, judges, and commentators to think about end-user license 
agreements in particular ways, it is worth exploring—and clarifying 
—what those intuitions mean for EULAs and digital assets, and when and whether 
they should be followed.  
In short, considering the typical role of and rationale behind property and contract 
will not only help us to decide what kind of EULA law we should have, but also will 
help us recognize how prior framings of and decisions about licenses created the 
EULA law we have. By understanding the effects of these choices, we can craft better 
and more consistent law. 
II. THE COMPOUND-PAUCITAL LICENSE
Consider a situation in which you come home from a local appliance or electron-
ics store with (or, more likely, have ordered for delivery from a major online store) 
a new home cleaning device similar to the popular “Roomba” vacuum cleaners.43
Your new device isn’t merely a vacuum cleaner—it is designed with various censors, 
a computer inside, and the abilities to connect to your wifi network and plug into a 
general-purpose computer. You can program it to run when you are not home, to 
only clean certain parts of your house, and to respond to voice commands like “clean 
the living room on Tuesday at 9:00.” But when you open the box, several sheets of 
papers fall out. The form begins, “End-User License Agreement for the Smart 
Vacuum,” and continues, 
                                                                                                                
ANTHONY M. KRONMAN, CONTRACTS 7–8 (3d ed. 1986) (reprinted in A CONTRACTS 
ANTHOLOGY 32, 34–35 (Peter Linzer ed., 2d ed. 1995)). 
39. See, e.g., John S. Brubaker, A Realistic Critique of Freedom of Contract in Labor Law 
Negotiation: Creating More Optimal and Just Outcomes, 5 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 107 (2012); 
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630–40 (1943); see also George L. Priest, Contracts Then and Now: An 
Appreciation of Friedrich Kessler, 104 YALE L.J. 2145, 2145 (1995) (“There is little question 
today that the role of courts in resolving contract disputes is to regulate underlying behavior 
and to protect parties in unequal bargaining positions.”).
40. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
41. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
42. See HOHFELD, supra note 15; see also Penner, supra note 22, at 712–13 (describing 
how Hohfeld’s work led to the development of the “bundle of sticks” view of property).
43. See generally Roomba Robot Vacuum, IROBOT, http://www.irobot.com/For-the 
-Home/Vacuuming/Roomba.aspx [https://perma.cc/K4RR-4XFK]. 
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 When first using the Smart Vacuum, you will be prompted on the de-
vice’s screen to agree to these terms. By clicking ‘yes,’ you agree to the 
following:  
 The Smart Vacuum software is licensed and not sold to you. Smart 
Vacuum Inc. grants you the rights to use the Smart Vacuum software for 
personal, non-commercial uses. You may not transfer your rights in the 
Smart Vacuum software to any third party. Any violation of the terms of 
this license agreement revokes your license to use this software . . . . 
The Smart Vacuum’s EULA creates a compound-paucital relationship. As in the 
case of in rem rights, large numbers of licensees have a relationship with the licensor 
who distributed the product, and the relationship exists because of the licensees’ and 
licensor’s connection to the copyrighted software. But the parties also know who 
each other are, as in the case of in personam rights, because many pieces of proprie-
tary software and digital media require the licensee to identify themselves in order to 
access the copyrighted work.44 The following sections analyze what these qualities 
teach us about how EULAs should be understood and regulated. 
A. Idiosyncrasy and Information Asymmetries 
One large difference between contract and property is that the number of people 
involved in contractual and property relationships changes how much negotiation 
over rights and duties is possible. Where two individuals sit down to hammer out a 
unique agreement for services from scratch, the costs each of them must shoulder, in 
terms of time and resources, to understand their agreement will be about the same. 
Moreover, to the extent that their contract covers unique circumstances, both parties 
may have similar interests in negotiating highly specific or idiosyncratic terms that 
advance their preferences for how the contract will be performed. And because the 
contract terms primarily affect those who are party to the contract, their idiosyncra-
sies won’t impose information-cost burdens on others. 
On the other hand, the transfer and form of property rights affects many people 
besides the owner of the property. As a result, property rights tend to be more stand-
ardized, because the existence of idiosyncratic property rights raises the costs of un-
derstanding their scope for third parties who must respect others’ rights.45
EULAs affect many people. In some cases, several licensors’ EULAs may be 
similar, such as when EULAs are trying to address a common situation like the trans-
fer of software that is already embedded in a physical device. EULAs that address 
these very common circumstances could plausibly be standardized. But in other 
cases, EULAs address circumstances where licensors’ needs will widely vary, such 
                                                                                                                
44. Sometimes works are purportedly licensed without the licensor knowing exactly 
whom the licensee is, for example if the licensor does not require downloaders to identify 
themselves in order to acquire and work the product. This phenomenon somewhat further un-
dermines the in personam nature of some EULAs. 
45. Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 802 (“[B]ecause in rem rights impinge on a very 
large and open-ended class of third persons, the legal rules must be designed so as to minimize 
the information-cost burden imposed on a great many persons beyond those who are respon-
sible for setting up the right.”).
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as the use of specialized software or software that manages access to a shared re-
source like a massively multiplayer online game. As a result, at least sometimes, the 
ability for EULAs to create detailed and unique rights and duties is highly desirable 
by both licensor and licensee. 
But, as license terms become more flexible and less standard, the costs associated 
with understanding them increases for licensees. In a purely in personam context, the 
complexity of these licenses would be bound by the costs the licensor and licensee 
would be willing to bear to draft the license. Where a potential use did not have 
significant economic implications, both licensor and licensee would be inclined to 
only devote minimal effort to reaching an agreement. Conversely, where a license 
has billion-dollar implications for multinational companies, the drafters might ration-
ally pay close attention to every term and create a very long and detailed license, 
addressing many circumstances that could arise. 
In a compound-paucital context, however, the costs borne by the licensor and li-
censee to understand the license are asymmetrical. Companies that license digital 
media and software to end users often use the same license for every download of a 
work. And as the number of end users increases, the asymmetry between the interests 
of licensors and end users grows. As of 2014, there were over 800 million iTunes 
accounts.46 Assume that just 100 million of those accounts have downloaded 100 
songs from the iTunes store for ninety-nine cents over the course of those accounts’ 
lives. Each of those users will have invested $99 in their relationship with Apple over 
the course of several years, often buying a single ninety-nine cent song at a time. On
the other side, Apple will have earned $10 billion of revenue from these transactions 
alone. With $10 billion at stake, Apple has a powerful economic incentive to hire an 
experienced legal team to draft its end-user license agreement and to go over the 
language with excruciating attention. On the other hand, users who spend less than 
$100 over a several-year period have much less of an incentive to pay attention to 
the content of the license’s terms, especially if they believe that their failure to abide 
by the agreement will probably only result in the loss of the licensed music.47 With 
                                                                                                                
46. Nigam Arora, Seeds of Apple’s New Growth in Mobile Payments, 800 Million iTune 
Accounts, FORBES (Apr. 24, 2014, 1:05 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nigamarora/2014/04 
/24/seeds-of-apples-new-growth-in-mobile-payments-800-million-itune-accounts/ [https:// 
perma.cc/UWS3-BYQF]. 
47. This calculation changes if you are concerned that misusing the licensed work could 
result in a copyright infringement judgement against you, which could top out at $150,000 per 
work infringed. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). Given that one’s anticipated loss also prices in the 
probability that one is sued for infringement, it is probably still rational for licensees not to 
read and understand the iTunes license agreement. On the other hand, Peggy Radin worries 
that one can easily overestimate one’s chances of avoiding low-probability events such as 
being sued for violating a boilerplate agreement. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE 
27 (2013) (“[I]t is hardly surprising that after we’ve received boilerplate [contracts so] many 
times without having any negative repercussions, we will persist in our acceptance of it. . . . It 
would take some extraordinary event, some real change in context, to make us stop doing what 
we’re used to doing when it seems to work.”); cf. id. at 103 (“Even if a recipient reads a boil-
erplate clause stripping him of his right to sue, and even if he then understands that this is what 
the clause does, he still would be very unlikely to take it seriously, because he is very unlikely 
to think the risk applicable to him.”). Similarly, if having exceeded the terms of one’s license 
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less than $100 at stake, an end user doesn’t have a strong economic incentive to try 
to read and understand the 20,000-word iTunes EULA.48 Given an average human 
reading speed of 300 words per minute,49 the iTunes EULA would take over an hour 
to read, not even considering any extra time necessary to understand what compli-
cated or jargon-filled terms meant. 
And although it might be reasonable to expect an end user to understand the terms 
of one EULA, the aggregate cost of understanding all licenses one encounters and 
agrees to become impracticable to bear as more appliances join the “Internet of 
Things,” and become “smart” and connected to a network, and as more media con-
sumption is of digital content rather than VHS tapes, over-the-air television, and LP 
records.50 Because users will not be able to read and understand the scope of every 
license they are granted, any of several outcomes will happen: users will not follow 
the licenses because they are unable to learn their content, licensees will spend an 
economically irrational amount of time trying to understand the licenses they agree 
to (unlikely, given that users typically don’t read licenses),51 or users will underuse 
the objects licensed to them out of fear of overstepping their rights.52  
Even if an end user did read the entire iTunes agreement, their options with re-
spect to it would be limited. If the user thought a term was unfair, they could choose 
not to license songs from iTunes anymore. However, the user couldn’t call up Apple 
                                                                                                                
has never resulted in any negative consequences, end users may believe that their actions re-
main within the scope of the license or are so inconsequential that the licensor does not care. 
If accurate, the end user is fine, but if the end user is misjudging the likelihood, they may have 
to pay high penalties. 
48. However, some more artistic approaches to engaging with the iTunes EULA might 
be more appealing. See Jacob Brogan, Steve Jobs Explains Apple’s User Agreement, SLATE
(Dec. 28, 2015, 10:24 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015 
/12/the_itunes_terms_and_conditions_comic_book_is_odd_brilliant.html [https://perma.cc 
/U97X-VYGK] (discussing R. SIKORYAK, ITUNES TERMS AND CONDITIONS: THE GRAPHIC 
NOVEL, https://itunestandc.tumblr.com/tagged/comics/chrono [https://perma.cc/EM8D 
-HG9N]); Rafe Needleman, Richard Dreyfuss Reads the iTunes EULA, CNET (June 8, 2011, 
4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/8301-30976_1-20068778-10348864.html [https:// 
perma.cc/BUP2-Y53A]).
49. Brett Nelson, Do You Read Fast Enough To Be Successful?, FORBES (June 4, 2012, 
9:09 AM),  http://www.forbes.com/sites/brettnelson/2012/06/04/do-you-read-fast-enough-to
-be-successful/ [https://perma.cc/PGS2-P82P].  
50. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The 
Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S375, S396 
(2002); Mulligan, supra note 14, at 264; Mulligan, supra note 8, at 1139–42, 1146–50, 1154–57. 
51. Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 516 
(2004) (“When boundaries are difficult for observers to decipher, . . . the chances are high that 
observers will inadvertently infringe or will spend inefficient amounts of time and cognitive 
resources attempting to determine the contours of the many facets of the propertarian relation-
ship.”); Mulligan, supra note 8, at 1138 (“While some people will coolly decide that it is not 
worth doing a record search on a cheap glass, others will feel a moral obligation to respect 
others’ rights and follow the law, even at a significant economic loss to themselves.”).
52. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 50, at 382–83 (“If two persons are both to 
have rights in a single asset, they need some means of assuring that they share a common 
understanding of those rights. Absent such understanding, the parties may mistakenly make 
inconsistent uses of the asset or underuse the asset.”); Mulligan, supra note 14, at 244–45. 
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and ask to change one of the clauses in the term—and with good reason. If Apple has 
hundreds of millions of account holders, the company cannot individually negotiate 
the terms of their EULA with every account holder.53
B. Regulating Licenses 
EULAs need flexibility, and their use creates an information asymmetry between 
licensor and licensee. The result of these phenomena is that neither the typical con-
tract nor property law strategy for regulation comfortably applies to EULAs. 
Property law typically relies on the use of standardized categories or forms, created 
by legislatures or judges, to delineate the scope of property rights.54 Standardization 
keeps the costs associated with respecting property rights low.55 But standard forms 
created by comparatively neutral actors, like legislators and judges, won’t always 
allow licensors and licensees the flexibility to create the rights and obligations they’d 
prefer in a EULA.56
On the other hand, contract law allows parties to negotiate flexible, idiosyncratic 
agreements, with a presumption that capable parties are relatively able to understand 
the contract terms and decide whether they want to agree to them.57 But EULAs are 
often so lengthy that it’s economically irrational for end users to read and evaluate 
the terms, while licensors have every incentive to draft EULAs that take advantage 
of the disparity between their and users’ capacity to understand and dictate license 
terms.58
Merrill and Smith argue that relationships on the property/contract interface have 
to, and do, adopt other tools to keep information costs associated with those relation-
ships low enough for all parties. They explain: 
[A]s rights take on more in rem features . . . informational demands be-
come greater. Short of requiring standardization to remove the extra in-
formation-processing load, the law can adopt one of two strategies: It can 
either facilitate the generation of information—the notice strategy—or it 
can impose a rule that favors the uninformed party in order to reduce that 
party’s need for information gathering—the protection strategy.59
                                                                                                                
53. Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 793–94 (“[A]s societies become more complex, with 
increasing numbers of persons and resources, rules of exclusion quickly become the more cost 
effective strategy for determining use rights. The simple reason is that the information costs 
of fixing all use rights to resources by in personam contract . . . would be prohibitive.”).
54. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 6, at 3. 
55. See id. at 35–40. 
56. Id. at 35 (“[S]tandardization imposes its own costs. Mandatory rules sometimes pre-
vent the parties from achieving a legitimate goal cost-effectively. Enforcing standardization 
can therefore frustrate the parties’ intentions.”).
57. Id. at 3 (“[O]utside . . . relatively narrow areas of proscription and requirements such 
as definiteness and (maybe) consideration, there is a potentially infinite range of promises that 
the law will honor.”).
58. Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 804–05. 
59. Id. at 805. 
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Both strategies offer tools for governing EULAs, although the protection strategy 
holds more promise. 
1. The Notice Strategy 
Legal systems that create incentives for greater notice and transparency will be 
effective when information about the rights in question can be inexpensively pro-
duced.60 But licenses are not impenetrable solely because licensors are choosing to 
obscure the terms of their agreements. Licenses are impenetrable because they are 
long, because each is different, and because nonexperts can’t understand all the terms 
in each one in a reasonable amount of time. End users usually already possess the 
information they need to be notified about in the license terms—they just can’t access 
it given how much information it is. 
Indeed, the opacity of EULAs is legion. Jokes or promises of prizes are occasion-
ally known to be written into licenses, as a hidden reward for the rare licensee who 
reads the terms.61 In 2005, PC Pitstop awarded $1000 to the first user who found the 
clause in its EULA promising the same, after 3000 downloads of the licensed content 
had occurred and four months had past.62 Even Supreme Court Chief Justice John 
Roberts admits he doesn’t read end-user license agreements.63 But what is important 
about EULAs is not that people choose not to read them, but that this choice stems 
from the reality that licensees cannot read all the licenses they agree to, let alone 
understand them. An analogous study of user privacy policies from 2008 estimated 
that individuals who read every privacy policy they agreed to online would each 
spend about 244 hours, or forty minutes a day, per year reading policies.64 As the 
number of networked objects and digital files we interact with everyday increases, 
we can expect that the figure for reading EULAs in general to also be both 
impracticable to read and to grow over time. As discussed above, the iTunes Terms 
                                                                                                                
60. Id. at 805 (“Notice will generally work best where information can be cost effectively 
produced, but this may not happen because those who have the information do not have suffi-
cient incentive to produce it or disclose it, or have a strategic incentive to keep the information 
secret.”). 
61. See, e.g., Nick Diamon, At Least 100 People Read the Fine Print in Divinity: Original 
Sin Enhanced Edition, QUARTER TO THREE (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.quartertothree.com/fp 
/2015/10/28/at-least-100-people-read-the-fine-print-in-divinity-original-sin-enhanced-edition 
[https://perma.cc/V5LY-SCMR] (describing a EULA offering a reward “to the first 100 
authorized licensees to actually read this section of the EULA and contact” the licensor).
62. The Pit Crew, It Pays To Read License Agreements (7 Years Later), TECHTALK (June 
12, 2012), http://techtalk.pcpitstop.com/2012/06/12/it-pays-to-read-license-agreements-7 
-years-later/ [https://perma.cc/ASC4-GVWF]. 
63. Mike Masnick, Supreme Court Chief Justice Admits He Doesn’t Read Online EULAs 
or Other ‘Fine Print,’ TECHDIRT (Oct. 22, 2010, 9:48 AM), http://www.techdirt.com 
/articles/20101021/02145811519/supreme-court-chief-justice-admits-he-doesn-t-read-online-
eulas-or-other-fine-print.shtml [https://perma.cc/CRE8-EPYA]; Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief 
Justice Roberts Admits He Doesn’t Read the Computer Fine Print, ABA J. (Oct. 20, 2010, 
12:17 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chief_justice_roberts_admits_he_doesnt 
_read_the_computer_fine_print/ [https://perma.cc/9HKA-2MCH]. 
64. Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies,
4 I/S 543, 563 (2008). 
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and Conditions are about 20,000 words alone. If an average adult reads 300 words 
per minute,65 it would take over an hour to read it. One hour may not sound like 
much, but the aggregate amount of time it would take someone to read all their agree-
ments to use intellectual property would not be practicable for an individual to allo-
cate, especially as more and more appliances and devices we purchase run software. 
The worry about end users’ inability to understand licenses might be less of a 
problem if consumer expectations tended to coincide with the rights granted by li-
censes. Then, even if licensees didn’t know what was in the license, it could be the 
case that end users would tend to follow licenses’ terms because they happened to 
coincide with the end users’ intuitions about what one can do with one’s purchases. 
But a recent study of end-user expectations by Aaron Perzanowski and Chris 
Hoofnagle belies this possibility. Perzanowski and Hoofnagle offered mock digital 
downloads to survey takers and asked them whether they believed it would be legal 
to use the licensed digital work in a way commonly associated with ownership: lend-
ing the work, giving it away, devising it in one’s will, or reselling it.66 Among e-book 
readers surveyed given the option to license a digital e-book, 46% believed they 
could lend the book, 36% believed they could give the book away, 26% believed 
they could devise the work in a will, and 14% believed that they could resell it.67 For 
comparison, of those surveyed given the option to buy a physical paperback book, 
75% believed they could lend it, 70% believed they could give it away, 47% believed 
they could devise it in a will, and 53% believed they could resell it.68 Perzanowski 
and Hoofnagle established that there is a large difference in expectations about what 
one can do with a purchased physical book and a licensed e-book, which does reflect 
how e-books are typically licensed. But they also showed that likely a quarter to a 
third of all e-book readers have a very mistaken set of expectations about what they 
can do with the books they have licensed.  
Although Perzanowski and Hoofnagle did not survey individuals about licensing 
software that runs in appliances, there is reason to expect that if they did, end users 
would be even more likely to be mistaken about their usage rights than they are about 
digital media. The networked objects that make up the “Internet of Things” and other 
software-embedded goods look to the outside observer like their nondigital counter-
parts. There are film cameras and digital cameras, clocks with and without gears, 
vacuums that must be moved by hand and vacuums whose movements are dictated 
by a computer algorithm. But although these tools perform the same functions, the 
property rights associated with them may be quite different. Traditionally, the law 
did not recognize usage restrictions of the type seen in license agreements on chattel 
property.69 Predigital copyright law also reflected the traditional first-sale doctrine 
                                                                                                                
65. Nelson, supra note 49. 
66. Aaron Perzanowski & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, What We Buy When We Buy Now, 165 
U. PA. L. REV. 315, 343–45 (2017). 
67. Id. at 378 tbl.3. 
68. Id. 
69. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 6, at 18 (“[A]lthough the case law is rather thin, it . . .
appears that one cannot create servitudes in personal property.”); Molly Shaffer Van 
Houweling, Touching and Concerning Copyright: Real Property Reasoning in MDY Indus.,
Inc. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1063, 1068 (2011) (“While courts have 
increasingly accommodated land servitudes, the conventional wisdom under Anglo-American 
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from personal property law. First under the Supreme Court decision Bobbs-Merrill 
Co. v. Straus,70 and then codified in statute,71 nondigital copies of copyrighted works 
were usually understood to be sold, not licensed or subject to later use or transfer 
restrictions, when acquired permanently after making a one-time payment. A store 
couldn’t sell a mop or typewriter for noncommercial use, or a nontransferable paper-
back book. But the software in digital appliances is often stated to be “licensed and 
not sold” or for “non-commercial use,”72 purportedly creating the same kind of usage 
restrictions that courts have refused to recognize on traditional appliances and tools. 
Given that the public has longstanding experience with property rights over phys-
ical objects, an instruction not to use a networked or software-embedded appliance 
for certain purposes would likely be even more unexpected than similar license terms 
applying to digital content like e-books and mp3s. Restrictive software license terms 
may be similarly surprising when a user does not directly experience their interaction 
with the software. When we drive a modern car or use a networked kitchen appliance, 
we usually don’t have the experience of downloading and executing the software. In 
contrast, when we download digital content or install software for a general-purpose 
computer, we are more aware that we are interacting with licensed material.  
In light of the length and variety of EULAs, a “notice strategy” could only effec-
tively inform end users of the content of the licenses if the relevant information were 
provided in a more pronounced and more abbreviated way. One potential strategy 
would be to try to highlight key terms to end users, such as how many copies of a 
work they can make and whether the copies can be transferred. Perzanowski and 
Hoofnagle have demonstrated that there’s reason to think highlighting terms could 
be mildly effective. In their study, Perzanowski and Hoofnagle used survey evidence 
to test what consumers thought they were doing when they acquired digital goods on 
                                                                                                                
law has long been that the types of servitudes that can be attached to land cannot be attached 
to chattels.”). See generally Mulligan, supra note 8 (exploring the tension between disallowing 
usage restrictions on personal property while permitting licenses on software embedded in 
personal property). Some courts have recognized particular chattel servitudes, but those cases 
are seen as rare exceptions to the general practice and belief that chattels cannot be burdened 
with servitudes. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable 
Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1255 (1956) [hereinafter Chafee 1956] 
(discussing Pratte v. Balatsos, 113 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1955), which appeared to recognize a 
servitude on a jukebox, and noting that “[s]ince 1928 and until Pratte v. Balatsos, [the author 
had] found seven cases of attempts to bind personal property by restrictions unsanctioned by 
legislation, and only three of these were successful”); Merrill & Smith, supra note 6, at 18–
19; Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1455–57 (2004) 
(noting that the author had “discovered only a few cases decided since 1956 involving attempts 
to create common law servitudes” on chattel property).
70. 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
71. Section 41 of the Copyright Act of 1909 provided, “[N]othing in this Act shall be 
deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the pos-
session of which has been lawfully obtained.” Now, the first sale doctrine is codified in 17 
U.S.C. § 109(a) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular 
copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, 
is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the 
possession of that copy or phonorecord.”).
72. E.g., Kindle Store Terms of Use, supra note 1. 
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legal sites.73 Participants were given a hypothetical digital good to acquire, and a 
button saying “Buy Now,” “License Now!,” or specifying a short list of key license 
terms.74 When participants were shown a short list of key license terms, they were 
somewhat more likely to correctly understand how the license affected the issues 
highlighted in the key terms than when they were merely urged to “license” the 
work.75 The largest difference was seen in participants asked whether they could lend 
an mp3 file. Of those who had only seen a “License Now!” button during the survey, 
42% believed they could lend the file to another person. But of those who had seen 
a short notice (which included a display indicating: “YOU MAY NOT: . . . Lend this 
mp3 album”),76 only 27% believed they could lend the file to another person.77 Other 
questions created notably smaller differences.78
While Perzanowski and Hoofnagle’s survey indicates that better notice can more 
effectively communicate to end users, even the mild effectiveness of the strategy 
tested in their survey relied on more than simply better notice; it also relied on a 
presumed expectation about what terms are salient to licensees. Perzanowski and 
Hoofnagle focused on licenses for end users to consume copies of digital media. In 
these cases, they (probably correctly) surmised that end users cared most about 
whether the copies could or could not be lent or transferred and whether they could 
or could not be copied to other devices. If correct, a short list of key terms may be 
capable of telling consumers of digital media a lot of the information they might want 
to know about how they can use the work. But for more varied licenses, or for li-
censes with many more important terms, a short list of license terms will be less 
helpful. Either the list will be too short, and leave out key terms, or the list will be 
comprehensive, and recreate the impenetrability problems associated with long li-
cense agreements discussed above. While notice may be of some help, it won’t fully 
                                                                                                                
73. Perzanowski & Hoofnagle, supra note 66, at 330–33.  
74. Id.
75. Id. at 345–50, 378 tbl.3. 
76. Id. at 348 fig.9. 
77. Id. at 378 tbl.3. 
78. For example, of those offered an mp3 to “License Now,” 42% believed they could 
give the work away, 26% thought they could bequeath it in a will, and 13% thought they could 
resell it. Id. In comparison, of those offered an mp3 with a short notice of terms, 36% believed 
they could give the work away, 21% thought they could bequeath it in a will, and 6% thought 
they could resell it. Id. Of those offered an eBook to “License Now,” 46% believed they could 
lend it, 36% believed they could give the work away, 26% thought they could bequeath it in a 
will, and 14% thought they could resell it. Id. In comparison, of those offered an eBook with 
a short notice of terms, 35% believed they could lend it, 28% believed they could give the 
work away, 13% thought they could bequeath it in a will, and 6% thought they could resell it. 
Id. Of those offered a digital movie to “License Now,” 42% believed they could lend it, 39% 
believed they could give the work away, 28% thought they could bequeath it in a will, and 
23% thought they could resell it. Id. In comparison, of those offered a digital movie with a 
short notice of terms, 31% believed they could lend it, 36% believed they could give the work 
away, 29% thought they could bequeath it in a will, and 17% thought they could resell it. Id. 
Contrary to the other comparisons, a slightly greater percentage of participants who received 
a short notice about a digital movie believed they could bequeath the film in a will than those 
who just saw “License Now.” Id.
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keep licensees informed of the substance of EULAs, nor will it give them the ability 
to substantively protect themselves from unfair terms.  
2. The Protection Strategy 
A protection strategy has wider ability to resolve the potential problems that 
EULAs can pose for licensees, particularly those problems that licensees are ration-
ally ignorant of.79 Indeed, Merrill and Smith’s survey of other institutions on the 
property/contract interface revealed that compound-paucital relationships tended to 
incorporate substantive protections for the numerous duty holders, rather than rely 
on providing better notice. In the case of bailments, bailees often issue tickets and 
receipts to bailors that “seek to disclaim the bailment relationship or to impose very 
low limits on the bailee’s liability.”80 Bailors’ stakes in most cases of bailment are 
quite small—the value of the bailed good, adjusted for the probability that it will be 
lost or destroyed. Resultingly, it’s neither plausible nor economically rational for 
bailors to try to negotiate the terms of their bailments with every coat check agent or 
valet.81 So the law steps in to protect bailors in the aggregate. Merrill and Smith 
identified “widespread legislative intervention” to regulate bailees trying to limit 
their liability, as well as “judicial policing” of unconscionable bailment agree-
ments.82
The evolution of landlord-tenant law also reveals the protection strategy at work. 
Where landlords use identical-form leases to let apartments in multiunit buildings, 
the landlord-tenant relationship can also develop a compound-paucital character, in 
which the standard-form leases “tend to be drafted from a pro-landlord perspec-
tive.”83 Tenants often do not understand the information in a long lease and are not 
in a position to evaluate whether a particular landlord is offering them favorable or 
unfavorable terms.84 And as Merrill and Smith note, “[I]t would not be cost effective 
for a tenant to retain a private lawyer at market rates to review a lease . . . or to hire 
an architect to inspect the premises.”85 They surmise that this reality may be one 
reason that the implied warranty of habitability in residential leases is not merely a 
default rule but an immutable rule.86 Tenants cannot waive it, and residential land-
lords cannot draft around it.  
Fans of private ordering might find themselves suspicious of Merrill and Smith’s 
argument that protective government intervention in compound-paucital relation-
ships is actually beneficial. After all, if the parties all assent to a license, or lease, or 
                                                                                                                
79. Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 807–08 (“We would expect compound-paucital sit-
uations to tend in the direction of the protection strategy. This is because the stakes for the 
numerous parties on one side of the relationship are apt, in most cases, to be too small to justify 
much processing of information over any but the most salient issues.”).
80. Id. at 814. 
81. Id. at 814–15.  
82. Id.
83. Id. at 826. 
84. Id. (“This would appear to be a classic instance of a compound-paucital relationship, 
characterized by incomplete information, especially on the part of the tenant.”).
85. Id. at 827. 
86. Id. at 826–27.
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bailment agreement, does that not indicate that they are better off for doing so than 
they would be otherwise? Would limiting how a license may be written discourage 
licensors from licensing certain products, or drive the cost of products up beyond that 
which licensees would prefer to pay? Does the implied warranty of habitability in-
crease rents and perversely render residential housing out of reach for the poorest 
renters? Would bailees simply not offer valet and coat check services if they would 
be liable for the full value of lost or damaged goods? 
These are important questions, but there is reason to believe that the information 
asymmetry present in compound-paucital relationships creates precisely the kind of 
market failure that can justify public intervention in the marketplace. As George 
Akerlof argued in his 1970 work The Market for Lemons, situations where buyers 
can’t evaluate the quality of a good can eventually drive down the quality of the good 
in question and lower sellers’ profits.87 Consider the example of digital media. 
Suppose a license for digital work that is very favorable to consumers is worth $3 to 
end users, and that a license to digital work that is very favorable to licensors is worth 
$1 to end users. If a licensee cannot evaluate the terms of the license themselves, 
they won’t be able to know if a given work is worth $3 or $1 to them. As a result, the 
perceived value of any given digital work will be the perceived average value of 
licenses in the marketplace—a value less than $3. Licensors will realize that licen-
sees will be willing to pay the same price for both consumer-favorable and licensor-
favorable licenses because they can’t tell the difference. As a result, licensors de-
velop the incentives to offer fewer licenses on consumer-favorable terms, because 
they can’t command a higher price for them even if consumers would actually prefer 
licenses that offer consumer-friendly terms and would pay more for them if they 
could be identified.88 As licensors offer more licensor-favorable licenses and fewer 
consumer-favorable licenses, the average value of EULAs available to consumers 
decreases, lowering the price consumers are willing to pay for digital media. The 
ensuing cycle of behavior can result in licensors offering licenses that consumers 
prefer less and in licensors earning less money from those licenses over time, because 
of the information asymmetry. 
Some solutions to Akerlof’s “lemon problem” are aimed at correcting the infor-
mation asymmetry.89 But at least in the context of EULAs, better notice can’t correct 
                                                                                                                
87. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–90 (1970). Russell Korobkin described how a “lemon 
market” might appear in the context of boilerplate contracts. Korobkin, supra note 21, at 1235 
(“Economists will recognize [the described] result as a type of ‘lemons’ problem: When buy-
ers cannot verify quality, the market will produce lower-quality goods. Ironically, far from 
guaranteeing a market equilibrium of efficient terms, competition can guarantee an equilib-
rium of inefficient terms.”).
88. See Guy A. Rub, Rebalancing Copyright Exhaustion, 64 EMORY L.J. 741, 789–90 
(2015) (“If buyers do not know if the copyrighted products they are buying can be trans-
ferred . . . , their purchasing decisions cannot incentivize the sellers to offer resale rights. This 
might encourage the sellers to sell . . . products that do not allow resale . . . for a price that is 
suitable for superior goods.”).
89. See Akerlof, supra note 87, at 499–500 (describing how repeat players in the market-
place like brand names and chain restaurants can help buyers better evaluate products over 
time). See generally Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient 
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the market failure unless we know that only a small number of terms in the license 
will actually be relevant to consumers. Another way to prevent the spiral towards 
worse products could be by mandating substantive floors on the quality of what can 
be offered to licensees (or to any group in a compound-paucital situation). We see an 
instance of this strategy appearing in compound-paucital relationships where resi-
dential landlords must warrant that the property is habitable. Mandating that partic-
ular uses of licensed works must be afforded to end users could have a similar effect. 
Of course, it is not certain that EULA-covered products are a “lemon market” as 
Akerlof describes. While there is an asymmetry in how well licensees and licensors 
understand the content of EULAs, licensees are not wholly ignorant of what they are 
purchasing. Because the digital content is accessible, they can correctly assess that 
the license renders the content accessible to them for at least some period of time, 
and that correct perception creates a floor for what consumers are willing to pay to 
access the content.  
Thus, there are two possibilities for how the market for licensed works has devel-
oped. First, we could be functioning in the “lemon” scenario, in which consumers 
would prefer more consumer-friendly licenses, and licensors would earn more by 
selling consumer-friendly licenses at a higher price. Second, we could be functioning 
in an environment where no market failure is present, in which customers or licensors 
genuinely wouldn’t prefer there to be more consumer-friendly licenses offered at a 
higher price. Although we can’t prove definitively what scenario we are in, the in-
formation asymmetries at play suggest that the former is very possible. As Russell 
Korobkin explains in an article discussing rights in boilerplate contracts generally, 
“Except in the unlikely circumstance in which all efficient terms are low quality, . . .
there is reason to suspect that form contracts will contain some terms that reduce 
both the welfare of buyers and social welfare generally.”90
Another way of understanding some corrective consumer-protection efforts in 
compound-paucital relationships would be framing them as another instance of law 
setting “the rules of the road” on which transactions can occur. Judges and legisla-
tures regulate property transfers, such as when they invalidate or refuse to recognize 
restraints on the alienation of property, dictate that one must have capacity to alienate 
property through a will, or specify that ownership of land does not extend to the 
airspace above it. Even if one believes natural rights in property precede government, 
one can also recognize the government’s being justified in regulating —in the sense 
of “making regular”—how property ownership occurs, the edges of what counts as 
a property right, and how property may be transferred. Such protective rules need not 
only serve the interests of the numerous parties to a compound-paucital relationship, 
any more than the general rules of property law only benefit purchasers or non-own-
ers.  
The question of what protective measures are desirable is inherently specific to 
the particular compound-paucital relationship at issue. That an implied warranty of 
habitability developed in landlord-tenant law tells us little about what specific pro-
tective terms are justified in EULAs. Nonetheless, we can be guided in choosing 
                                                                                                                
Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 491 (1981) (suggesting measures to 
improve communication of information to customers). 
90. Korobkin, supra note 21, at 1234. 
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what substantive protections are justified by focusing on the problems that might 
arise from market failure and from the creation of negative externalities. Substantive 
regulation in EULA law should be most appropriate when we have reason to believe 
that consumers would prefer a protection and that licensors would prefer to offer the 
term if that meant they could earn a suitably higher profit on the licensed work, or 
when the term will lower information costs associated with parties to the license and 
third parties using the work. The following two Parts evaluate particular terms com-
mon in EULAs and suggest consumer protection measures that can mitigate the prob-
lems they cause. 
III. RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION AND USE
Many licenses to use digital content and software claim to “license and not sell” 
copies of a work to the end user.91 By licensing uses rather than selling the copy, 
licensors try to prevent end users from securing the legal rights typically associated 
with ownership, such as a general right to use and to alienate the property to another 
party. Instead, they offer the end user limited rights, often a perpetual right to make 
“personal uses” of the work,92 which cannot be transferred to other parties. As with 
purely in rem property, restraints on the use and alienation of copies raise information 
costs associated with property use and transfer, and can prevent assets from finding 
their highest-valued uses. The balance of this Part explores those effects, and sug-
gests that certain use rights be guaranteed or favored and that restraints on alienation 
be void. 
A. Harms Caused by Restraints on Alienation and Use 
1. Increased Information Costs 
In previous works, I have criticized EULAs that purport to grant users narrow, 
idiosyncratic rights, largely on economic grounds.93 Foremost, permitting licenses to 
set forth narrow and idiosyncratic rules for how digital works may be used will raise 
the costs associated with making uses of those works, specifically “discovery costs” 
and “processing costs.”94 Discovery costs are the effort associated with locating the 
information needed to understand how the work may be used.95 In the typical end 
                                                                                                                
91. E.g., Kindle Store Terms of Use, supra note 1; Apple Media Services Terms and 
Conditions, supra note 3. 
92. E.g., Kindle Store Terms of Use, supra note 1. 
93. See generally Mulligan, supra note 14; Mulligan, supra note 8. 
94. See Mulligan, supra note 8, at 1132. 
95. Id. Discovery costs are one of the types of transaction costs identified by Ronald 
Coase in The Problem of Social Cost. Coase explained:  
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that 
one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what 
terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, 
to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are 
being observed, and so on. These operations are often extremely costly, suffi-
ciently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be carried out 
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user’s case, in order to be confident that one’s uses are legal, one must locate the 
end-user license agreement or terms of use that delineates how the work can be used. 
Processing costs are the cost of understanding that information once it is found—the 
time it takes to read and understand the license agreement.96 As discussed above, 
these costs can grow excessively high for licensees and prevent them from under-
standing the scope of their license.97
Superficially, a license’s restraint on alienation might appear to limit the infor-
mation costs borne by parties not subject to the license. After all, someone who can’t 
get permission to interact with the licensed work has the same obligation there as 
they have to any “thing” they don’t own or have permission to use: to abstain from 
interacting with the item. But restraints on alienation do cause third parties’ infor-
mation costs to rise in a marketplace for second-hand goods. If some digital copies 
and even smart appliances’ software are not transferrable, then third parties must 
endure higher information costs in the marketplace when faced with a purported 
“owner” of the item. In order to know if the seller has the authority to transfer the 
item, the aspiring purchaser must inquire about whether the item includes any digital 
content or software that was licensed and what the terms were, facing potentially 
high discovery and processing costs. Buyers must shoulder this cost even if it turns 
out that the item they are interested in purchasing is transferrable.98
Moreover, the stakes for the aspiring second-hand purchaser are higher than that 
of an original licensee of a smart appliance or digital work. Original licensees gen-
erally correctly surmise that licenses offered by original sellers allow them to pri-
vately use the appliance or experience the work. Indeed, even if such licenses were 
not explicitly granted, consumers would have a strong argument that, by offering the 
appliance or digital copy to consumers in the first place, manufacturers had implicitly 
licensed necessary uses of the work to those end users.99 Companies have additional 
incentives not to bring lawsuits against their customers for de minimus, good-faith 
uses of licensed works that exceed the scope of the license. To avoid alienating their 
customer base with negative public relations, they might prefer to ignore some mis-
use, to merely issue warnings, or to use technological protection measures to enforce 
limitations on how the work is used. However, the landscape for second-hand buyers 
is quite different. Unlike an original licensee, a second-hand buyer cannot have a 
reasonable belief that they will have the legal authority to use the work, so long as it 
is possible that the initial license to use the work was nontransferable. Moreover, the 
producer of the product or work won’t have the same incentives to promote goodwill 
and not take legal action against second-hand buyers who have not paid the licensor 
                                                                                                                
in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost. 
R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (emphasis added). 
96. See Mulligan, supra note 8, at 1132; Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: 
Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2003). 
97. See supra text accompanying notes 46–48. 
98. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 6, at 26–27, 33; Mulligan, supra note 14, at 243–44.
99. See Parker v. Yahoo!, Inc., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1779, 2008 WL 4410095 (E.D. Pa. 2008); 
Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1116 (D. Nev. 2006); WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY 
ON COPYRIGHT § 5:131 (“[C]ourts have noted the potential availability of an implied nonex-
clusive license when the circumstances . . . demonstrate that the parties intended that the work 
would be used for a specific purpose.”).
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at all. As a result, the information costs for second-hand buyers will be higher—they 
really do need to locate and understand the license to have reason to believe they can 
legally use the work—as well as the stakes, given that second-hand buyers are likely 
at greater risk of incurring significant legal liability for infringement. 
In the context of physical property law, the risks incurred by good-faith buyers 
were generally limited to the value of the good purchased. At common law, actions 
for trover and replevin would force the wrongful possessor of a chattel to pay the 
object’s value or to return the chattel to its true owner.100 Comparatively, the costs of 
mistakenly acquiring and using a copyrighted digital work or copyrighted software 
are dramatically higher and disproportionate to the value of the copy, because copy-
right law provides for statutory damages of up to $30,000 per work infringed, rising 
to $150,000 if the infringement is willful.101 Efforts to challenge the statutory dam-
ages provisions for violating procedural due process have failed to date.102 As a re-
sult, although few license violators are taken to task for their actions, the conse-
quences if one is sued are potentially life changing. The risk of liability also stays 
constant so long as the work continues to be used. Although there is a three-year 
statute of limitations on bringing an action for copyright infringement, each new use 
of the work that creates a potentially infringing reproduction restarts the clock on the 
copyright owner’s ability to sue for infringement.103
Notably, the information costs associated with wanting to acquire a second-hand 
copy of a digital work or smart appliance must be paid by all aspiring second-hand 
purchasers, whether or not the work or appliance a buyer is interested in is subject to 
a nontransferable license.104 Even though many smart appliances may include soft-
ware that is sold or for which the license is transferable, a potential buyer won’t know 
whether the present possessor has the right to transfer the work unless they investi-
gate whether there was a license and what the terms provided. As a result, the exist-
ence of nontransferable licenses to digital works and to the software in smart devices 
raises the costs for all second-hand buyers who might want to acquire copies of dig-
ital copyrighted works.  
Present practice indicates many freestanding digital works, such as music files 
and e-books, are not transferable, so a critic might suggest that buyers should resolve 
this problem by presuming that no digital works can be resold. But this is not entirely 
true—at least some popular authors, such as Cory Doctorow, and musicians, such as 
Jonathan Coulton, license their work in order to explicitly permit someone in the 
                                                                                                                
100. Trover, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “trover” as “[a] com-
mon-law action for the recovery of damages for the conversion of personal property, the dam-
ages generally being measured by the property’s value”); Replevin, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014) (defining “replevin” as “[a]n action for the repossession of personal property 
wrongfully taken or detained by the defendant”).
101. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). 
102. See David Kravets, Supreme Court Lets Stand $675,000 File-Sharing Verdict,
WIRED (May 21, 2012, 11:06 AM), https://www.wired.com/2012/05/supreme-court-file 
-sharing/[ https://perma.cc/TL9B-SAZB]; David Kravets, Supreme Court OKs $222k Verdict 
for Sharing 24 Songs, WIRED (Mar. 18, 2013, 11:58 AM), https://www.wired.com 
/2013/03/scotus-jammie-thomas-rasset/ [https://perma.cc/76CM-6RQ5]. 
103. See 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012). 
104. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 6, at 26–27, 33; Mulligan, supra note 14, at 243–44.
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second-hand buyer’s position to acquire and use it.105 And even if restraints on alien-
ation are dominant in licenses for digital media, there seems to be more variety 
among licenses for the software inside smart appliances and devices. For example, 
the Sodastream Carbonator appliance comes with a user license that specifies, “[t]he 
Carbonator, together with this User License, may be transferred to a third party pro-
vided the third party agrees to be obligated by the conditions and ownership rights 
expressed herein.”106 And as more and more appliances and devices are developed 
to include small computers, it may get less clear whether an appliance like a coffee 
machine or blender includes licensed, copyrighted software at all. 
Nontransferability clauses raise the costs for everyone to buy and borrow any 
good that might include digital, copyrighted works. But beyond increased infor-
mation costs, restraints on alienation and usage restrictions also decrease the value 
and usefulness of valuable works and objects. 
2. Waste 
Restraints on the alienation of digital content and software create waste. Any in-
alienable copy of a work has the potential to be used by another or repurposed for a 
new use, but the fact that licensees often do not have the right to transfer their rights 
eliminates this potential. Depending on the nature of the licensed work, the perni-
ciousness of this phenomenon varies. The most problematic case involves the appli-
ances that run software. Software-embedded goods have two conceptually separate 
parts that are subject to very different property regimes: the physical object, and the 
intellectual-property-protected software.107 Usually the physical object—the vacuum 
cleaning parts of the Roomba, the lenses of one’s digital camera—is sold to a buyer, 
and may be resold under the traditional first sale doctrine. But the software that runs 
inside the object is typically licensed and may purport to limit licensees’ ability to 
alienate their rights to use the software.108 If a licensee decides they no longer want 
their smart device, they may not have the rights to transfer the copy of the device’s 
software to a second-hand buyer. In this case, they must either unlawfully distribute 
the work, or they can simply throw away or destroy the work, eliminating any poten-
tial value it could have to others. Although the appliance itself may be transferred, 
an inability to transfer the license to use an appliance’s software will often render the 
appliance itself useless to anyone but the licensee. In this case, we get not just a waste 
of valuable resources—someone could derive benefit from the appliance but is not 
                                                                                                                
105. See Glenn, Cory Doctorow, CREATIVE COMMONS (Aug. 1, 2005), https://creative 
commons.org/2005/08/01/doctorow [https://perma.cc/5BZQ-XW4K]; Melissa, Commoner 
Letter #3: Jonathan Coulton, CREATIVE COMMONS (Nov. 17, 2008), https://creative 
commons.org/2008/11/17/commoner-letter-3-jonathan-coulton/ [https://perma.cc/P978-FL5C]. 
106. SODASTREAM, USER LICENSE FOR ONE SODASTREAM CARBONATOR,
https://www.sodastreamusa.com/assets/ulc.pdf [https://perma.cc/2U25-69C7].
107. For an in-depth discussion of how these dual property systems work, see 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright and Good Faith Purchasers, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 269 
(2016). 
108. For an explanation of why merely running a piece of software may be interpreted as 
infringing the software’s copyright, see supra note 28. 
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legally permitted to—but a physical waste, where otherwise useful objects are de-
stroyed or thrown away, or costs must be paid to recycle or repurpose the object.109
The law works to artificially limit the good’s value.
For purely digital content, the waste is not physical—mp3 files will not take up 
space in a landfill—and the cost of making an additional, new copy is negligible for 
the copyright owner. But the potential waste of economic and social value remains 
real. Disallowing alienation of copies means that everyone who wants to access a 
work must locate and deal with someone authorized to grant licenses to the work, 
usually the copyright owner itself and large intermediary actors.110 If the copyright 
holder goes out of business or stops selling the work, the costs of merely figuring out 
who to deal with rise dramatically.111 As technology changes, compatibility and 
preservation issues also arise.112 Over time, digital works will remain easier to access 
and will be more likely to remain in existence and accessible if more parties have 
legal and actual access to them.113  
B. Limiting Harm with Protective Standardization 
The previous section set forth several concerns about using licenses to grant idi-
osyncratic rights to use copyrighted works and to restrain alienation of copies of 
those works. One protective response would be to render void any restrictions on the 
alienation of licensed products. Another would be to limit what use restrictions could 
be placed on licenses, or mandate that particular uses be authorized under any license. 
But because any movement towards standardization comes at the cost of flexibility, 
particular licensee-protective measures must be considered carefully.114
                                                                                                                
109. The inability to alienate or change how software-running objects can be used echoes 
the concern Zechariah Chafee had about creating servitudes or use restrictions on chattels: that 
there would be “no possibility of affixing a reasonable termination to the life of the restriction 
[on a chattel] coëxtensive with the realization of [its] purpose.” Zechariah Chafee, Equitable 
Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945, 985 (1928). 
110. See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 
894 (2011) (“[F]irst sale improves both the affordability and availability of copyrighted works 
by fostering secondary markets for lawful copies and distribution models that operate outside 
of copyright holder control.”); R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital 
Networks, 44 B.C. L. REV. 577, 585–94 (2003). 
111. See Perzanowski & Schulz, supra note 110, at 894–85; Reese, supra note 110, at 633. 
112. “[W]ithout some sort of digital resuscitation, every application [program] . . . eventu-
ally stops working, and every data file eventually becomes unreadable. Every application and 
every file.” Reese, supra note 110, at 638–39 (alterations not pertaining to capitalization in 
original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Claire Tristram, Data Extinction, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 
1, 2002), http://www.technologyreview.com/communications/12975 [https://perma.cc/X2GL-
CY52]); see also Mulligan, supra note 14, at 280. A common mantra associated with digital 
preservation is “lots of copies keeps stuff safe.” See, e.g., Preservation Principles, LOCKSS,
http://www.lockss.org/about/principles [https://perma.cc/K5E8-DU95]. 
113. As Reese explained, if there is one copy of a work with a one in one hundred chance 
of being destroyed in a given year, there is only a 13% chance it will still exist in two hundred 
years. Whereas, if there are 100 copies, the chance that at least one copy will survive in a 
hundred years is 99.9999944%. Reese, supra note 110, at 605–06. 
114. Cf. Korobkin, supra note 21, at 1245 (“Despite the likelihood that the unregulated 
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One measure worth considering would be to treat EULAs that authorize indefinite 
use of a particular copy of a work as transferring title of the relevant copy to an end 
user. This would allow the copy to be transferred to second-hand customers and pro-
vide a floor of rights that end users could be confident about exercising over copies 
of digital works. 
Consider, as an example, the software that runs in smart appliances, such as the 
smart vacuum cleaner described at the beginning of this Article. This vacuum is 
given to the end user indefinitely, in exchange for a one-time payment. The end user 
need not act in concert with the manufacturer to maintain the functionality of the 
vacuum cleaner over time. Compared to other established ways of transferring pos-
session of a copy—by rental, lease, and lending115—this behavior looks most like a 
sale, largely because there is no requirement that the vacuum’s software be returned 
to the seller. 
Two challenges stand in the way of protectively reading EULAs to favor title 
transfer. First, case law has been developing in the opposite direction, tending to 
validate licensors’ claims that works are “licensed not sold.” Second, the notion of 
what a “digital sale” even would be is very difficult to specify in a workable fashion 
given current law. The rest of this section will explore and attempt to resolve those 
challenges.  
1. The License v. Sale Distinction in Practice 
Most purveyors of software and digital goods attempt to license, rather than sell, 
copies of their works. Whether a copyright holder characterizes a transfer as a license 
or sale has legal consequence: in the 2010 Ninth Circuit decision Vernor v. Autodesk,
Inc., the panel held that one of the three factors relevant to whether a copy had been 
licensed or sold was “whether the copyright owner specifies that a user is granted a 
license.”116 Nonetheless, the statement that a work is “licensed and not sold” is not 
the end of the story. On the same day the Vernor v. Autodesk decision was argued,117
the same panel of judges also heard the case UMG v. Augusto,118 which ultimately 
held that the plaintiff, UMG Recordings, had effectively transferred title to several 
promotional CDs, despite its stated attempts to merely transfer a license.119 UMG 
had sent promotional music CDs to music critics and disc jockeys. Written on some 
CDs was the statement,  
                                                                                                                
market will produce inefficiently low-quality terms, . . . it is not obvious a priori that the mar-
ket would lead to worse results than available alternatives . . . . The virtues and vices of gov-
ernment intervention must be compared carefully to those of non-intervention.”).
115. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012). 
116. 621 F.3d 1102, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2010). The other two factors were “whether the 
copyright owner significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software” and “whether 
the copyright owner imposes notable use restrictions” on the work. Id.
117. Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual and Personal Property,
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1227 (2015). 
118. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011). 
119. Id. at 1180. 
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This CD is the property of the record company and is licensed to the 
intended recipient for personal use only. Acceptance of this CD shall 
constitute an agreement to comply with the terms of the license. Resale 
or transfer of possession is not allowed and may be punishable under 
federal and state laws.120  
The defendant, Augusto, acquired the CDs from various sources and then resold 
them on eBay.121 Despite the statement written on the CDs, the court held that title 
had been transferred to the CDs’ initial recipients, and that Augusto was therefore 
able to acquire title to them himself.122
Reconciling the holdings of Vernor and Augusto is difficult. One possibly dispos-
itive difference is that the initial recipients of the CDs in Augusto did nothing to 
assent to the license. A second possibility is “software exceptionalism”—the notion 
that courts are simply more willing to recognize attempts to license software (and 
other digital media) than they are to license physical copies of copyrighted works 
like CDs. Augusto hints at this possibility by noting that “[p]articularly with regard 
to computer software, we have recognized that copyright owners may create licens-
ing arrangements.”123
The holdings of Vernor and Augusto teach that, while copyright holders can 
strongly influence the legal character of what they do by labeling it, those labels are 
not dispositive. Sometimes courts are willing to look beyond statements that a work 
is “licensed but not sold” and decide that, legally, the copy of the work had been sold 
and title to it had been transferred. The difficult question is when courts should ignore 
the terms of a license and declare that what really has occurred is a transfer of title.  
Other scholars have wrestled with this question, among them Aaron Perzanowski,
Jason Schultz, and Brian Carver. Carver surveyed existing cases and described five 
approaches courts have taken in practice to decide whether a transaction was a sale 
or granted a license. One is the “reservation of title” or “magic words” approach, in 
which a copyright holder’s statement that they are reserving title to the copy alone 
determines whether a copy is licensed or sold.124 A second option, the “agreement 
controls” approach, is to look to the four corners of the terms of the agreement be-
tween copyright holder and end user and look at whether the terms as a whole create 
a situation more like a license or a sale.125 Although this approach still gives the 
                                                                                                                
120. Id. at 1177–78. Others simply were marked “Promotional Use Only—Not for Sale.” 
Id. at 1178. 
121. Id. at 1178. 
122. Id. at 1180. 
123. Id. (emphasis added). 
124. Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy Ownership: First 
Sales and Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887, 1898–1904 (2010). Carver cited 
several cases as examples of the magic words or reservation of title approach, including MAI 
Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. 
County Sheriff’s Department, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 
F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989); and Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Electronics, Inc.,
846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). Carver, supra. 
125. Carver, supra note 124, at 1898, 1905–13. As examples of the “agreement control” 
approach, Carver cites Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); DSC 
Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999); MDY 
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copyright holder the ability to decide whether they are licensing or selling the copy, 
it takes into account what the agreement actually grants, rather than merely relying 
on the label the copyright holder has used.  
A third approach relies on the terms of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) 
to ascertain when a transfer of title has taken place.126 According to Carver, cases 
that follow the UCC “tend[] to arise when courts are more concerned with the goods 
being transferred and less focused on the copyrighted works that may be embodied 
in those goods” and when “there is less of a dispute about whether a sale occurred or 
was attempted, and more of a question of who currently owns the underlying 
goods.”127 The UCC does not really contemplate the licensing of physical goods. It 
provides, “[t]he retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding 
shipment or delivery to the buyer under Section 2-401 is limited in effect to the res-
ervation of a ‘security interest.’”128  
Fourth, some courts have looked more at the “actual character . . . of the transac-
tion” rather than the label the copyright holder put on it or the written terms of the 
license.129 Carver deems this the “economic realities” approach. Each of the three 
cases he cites as exemplary of this approach present very different fact patterns, but 
the overall tenor of the decisions is that the courts looked at the underlying qualities 
of what the recipient acquired, rather than the terms used in the agreement.130 In one 
case, an actress was deemed to be the owner of a film print given to her perpetually 
for her “personal use and enjoyment,” despite a term stating that she could not trans-
fer ownership of the print.131 In another case, a distributor of Microsoft software was 
deemed to be the owner of several units of software that had been transferred perma-
nently to the distributor, to be paid on an installment plan, even though the agreement 
between the distributor and Microsoft declared that the software units were li-
censed.132 In the third case, the Second Circuit evaluated whether a custom piece of 
                                                                                                                
Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL 
2757357 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008); Novell, Inc. v. Unicom Sales, Inc., No. C-03-2785, 2004 
U.S. Dist. Lexis 24538 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2004); and Novell, Inc. v. CPU Distributing, Inc.,
No. H-97-2326, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9975 (S.D. Tex. May 4, 2000). Carver, supra. The 
holding in the 2008 Blizzard court opinion that the World of Warcraft software had been li-
censed and not sold was later affirmed in MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment Co.,
629 F.3d 928, 938–39 (9th Cir. 2010). 
126. Carver, supra note 124, at 1898, 1914–15. Carver cites as examples of this approach: 
Classic Concepts, Inc. v. Linen Source, Inc., Nos. 04-8088 & 04-0857, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
96767, at *49–50 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2006); Synergistic Technology, Inc. v. IDB Mobile 
Commissions, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 24, 29 (D.D.C. 1994); Mahru v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. 
Rptr. 298, 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Old West Realty, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission,
716 P.2d 1318, 1320–21 (Idaho 1986); Skripak v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 285, 315 (T.C. 
1985); and Middlebrooks v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1187, at *12–15 (T.C. 1975). 
Carver, supra. 
127. Carver, supra note 124, at 1914. 
128. U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). 
129. Carver, supra note 124, at 1915 (quoting RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF 
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 1.18[1][a], at 1-103 (1992)).  
130. See Carver, supra note 124, at 1915–19. 
131. United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir. 1977). 
132. Microsoft Corp. v. DAK Indus., Inc., 66 F.3d 1091, 1093–96 (9th Cir. 1995); see also 
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software had been sold or licensed for purposes of the recipient’s relying on the rights 
enumerated under 17 U.S.C. § 117(a), stating,  
[I]t seems anomalous for a user whose degree of ownership of a copy is 
so complete that he may lawfully use it and keep it forever, or if so dis-
posed, throw it in the trash, to be nonetheless unauthorized to fix it when 
it develops a bug, or make an archival copy as backup security. . . . [In 
determining ownership under 17 U.S.C. § 117(a),] courts should inquire 
into whether the party exercises sufficient incidents of ownership over a 
copy of the program . . . . The presence of absence of formal title may of 
course be a factor in this inquiry, but the absence of formal title may be 
outweighed by evidence that the possessor of the copy enjoys sufficiently 
broad rights over it to be sensibly considered its owner.133
The division of “formal title” from the rights of ownership may perhaps better be 
framed as the Second Circuit’s recognizing that the choice of a seller to use the label 
“license” or “sale” does and should not determine who an owner is. Rather, owner-
ship is and should be determined by the actual, overall character of the rights granted 
to the software’s recipient. 
Finally, Carver notes that the district court opinions in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 
Augusto134 and Vernor v. Autodesk135 seemed to narrow the considerations in play in 
the “economic realities” approach and hold that the right to perpetual possession of 
a copy was enough to trigger a sale.136 This is the position Carver ultimately advo-
cates.137 Carver concludes that perpetual possession “is the key factor that distin-
guishes sales and gifts on the one hand, and leases and lending on the other” and that 
“transferring perpetual possession of a copy but retaining title to the copy, is both 
incoherent and not found in the Copyright Act.”138
Writing five years later, in a different era for e-commerce, Perzanowski and 
Schultz believe that perpetual possession is a key factor, but cannot be dispositive 
alone given recently developed business models for providing digital content.139  
They write, 
When a user rents a movie from iTunes, for example, a full copy is de-
livered to her hard drive that she can retain in perpetuity. What distin-
guishes that file from a purchased movie title is not that it must be re-
turned, but that a small bit of code renders the file unplayable after a 
                                                                                                                
Datalex (Ireland) Ltd. v. PSA, Inc., No. CV 01-06482 DDP, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 27563, at 
*6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2003) (citing DAK Indus., 66 F.3d at 1095) (stating that the economic 
realities of a transaction determine whether it is a sale, lease, or license).  
133. Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2005). 
134. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d, 628 
F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011). 
135. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., No. C07-1189RAJ, 2009 WL 3187613, at *11–14 (W.D. 
Wash. Sept. 30, 2009); Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (W.D. Wash. 2008). 
136. See Carver, supra note 124, at 1920–25.  
137. Id. at 1952, 1954. 
138. Id. at 1954. 
139. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 117, at 1256. 
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designated period of time. An exhaustion rule premised on perpetual pos-
session alone could foreclose this business model and interfere with cre-
ative incentives. Conversely, a transaction that is called a sale and re-
quires a one-time payment for unlimited ongoing access to a work may 
not require possession in the traditional sense of the word at all. A con-
sumer who “buys” an MP3 from Amazon and stores and accesses that 
file from Amazon’s Cloud Player appears to satisfy the requirements for 
exhaustion despite never having done more than access a temporary, 
ephemeral data stream.140
Perzanowski and Schultz advocate for taking three key factors into account when 
determining whether a sale has taken place and the copyright holder has exhausted 
their rights to a particular copy of the work: “[t]he duration of consumer possession 
or access; . . . [w]hether the payment structure is one-time or ongoing; and . . . [t]he 
characterization of the transaction communicated to the consumer, including whether 
it is referred to as a sale or purchase.”141 Although a copyright holder’s stated intent 
is still relevant, Perzanowski and Schultz move the focus from what a copyright 
holder says to how the transaction actually works outside the stated terms of the li-
cense: if an end user pays once or a fixed number of times in exchange for perpetual 
possession or access, courts should be more inclined to understand the activity as a 
sale.142 In more pithy terms, for Perzanowski and Schultz, if it walks like a sale, and 
acts like a sale, the transaction is a sale. 
2. What Is a Digital Sale? 
Even if we accept Carver’s or Perzanowski and Schultz’s conclusion about when 
transactions should qualify as sales or licenses, the question of what rights are asso-
ciated with a digital sale remain a separate, vexing puzzle under current law. When 
a purchaser buys a nondigital good containing a copyrighted work, the purchaser 
gains the right to distribute and display that particular copy of the work.143 They also 
may read or privately perform (i.e., play) the work, because neither of these acts 
implicates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright holder.144 Owning a nondigital 
work is thus a valuable proposition: when you own a book or an LP record, you 
generally have the legal authority to use it privately however you like.145
However, owning a digital file is far more complicated under current law. Under 
a widely held, though much-criticized, interpretation of the copyright holder’s exclu-
sive right to reproduce a copyrighted work, the very act of opening or running a 
digital file is enough to create an actionable reproduction of the work because run-
ning the file creates a temporary copy of the work in a computer’s random access 
                                                                                                                
140. Id. at 1256–57. 
141. Id. at 1256. 
142. See Id. at 1256. 
143. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), (c) (2012).  
144. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
145. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 117, at 1249 (arguing that owning a copy of 
a good, and the right to alienate it, “offer[s] consumers real value,” while licensed copies “lack 
the freedoms customers expect” and are therefore “less desirable” to acquire legally).
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memory (RAM).146 This interpretation is commonly referred to as the “RAM copy 
doctrine”147 or as the holding of MAI Systems v. Peak Computer.148 The reasons to 
resist the RAM copy doctrine are fairly plain. First, it turns any use of a digital work 
into an action that requires a copyright holder’s permission, in stark contrast to how 
copyright applies in nondigital situations. Second, the doctrine exists in tension with 
the Copyright Act’s apparent requirement that copies be “sufficiently permanent or 
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a pe-
riod of more than transitory duration.”149 Nonetheless, many courts and copyright 
holders follow the RAM copy doctrine.  
Besides the RAM copy doctrine, however, there are more fundamental differences 
in how digital works are used. If you want to read a physical book that you keep at 
home on a bus, you just carry it out your front door. If you want to play a song from 
a record for a friend, you carry the record over to your friend’s house to play it on 
their record player. These activities do not require any copyright-implicating behav-
ior. But digital files are often not merely carried around. If you have a file saved on 
your desktop or laptop computer, it might not be possible or useful to carry that com-
puter onto a busy bus or to a friend’s house. To be as functional as their analog equiv-
alents, people make a copy of the work on small devices like a tablet, phone, or flash 
drive, even when no one is going to use the works but themselves. Digital goods are 
most useful when someone is not worried about making copies for personal uses and 
convenience. Making copies for personal use creates the same functionality as car-
rying a nondigital work around. Yet, with far more certainty than cases involving the 
RAM copy doctrine, each of these copies plainly qualifies as a reproduction under 
the Copyright Act. 
The absurdity inherent in owning, but being unable to use, a digital good is theo-
retically mitigated by § 117 of the Copyright Act. Section 117 attempts to write sen-
sible rules for ownership of a software program. Under § 117, it is not an infringe-
ment of copyright to make a copy of a work if it is an “essential step” in using the 
program with a machine or if the copy is for archival purposes (keeping in mind that 
computers can unexpectedly break without external indication).150 Copies made un-
der § 117 can only be transferred to others if the owner of the copy they were made 
from is transferring their original, owned copy as well.151 Additionally, copies of an 
owned work can be made if it is a necessary part of activating a computer in the 
course of repairing it.152 Cases like MAI Systems v. Peak Computer153 have limited 
the application of § 117 because so many copyright holders successfully maintain 
that their software is “licensed and not sold” to end users.154 But if it were more 
                                                                                                                
146. See supra note 28. 
147. See, e.g., Perzanowski, supra note 28, at 1070 (“The Rise of the RAM Copy 
Doctrine”). 
148. MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 518. 
149. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining copies as “fixed” and defining “fixed” as being 
perceivable for “a period of more than transitory duration”).
150. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2012).  
151. Id. § 117(b) (2012). 
152. Id. § 117(c) (2012). 
153. 991 F.2d at 511. 
154. Id. at 518 n.5. 
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broadly applicable, § 117 would provide a fairly workable system for rendering 
owned copies of software useful to their owners, particularly when the sold copy 
arrives already inside a smart appliance. 
Unfortunately, the Copyright Act does not have anything like § 117 that applies 
to digital files or digital media in general. As a result, it is difficult to decipher what 
the idea of “owning a file” means in practice for digital media. Under the RAM copy 
doctrine, one would be forbidden from even opening an owned media file, and if one 
had downloaded the sold copy initially onto one device, or brought it home on a CD, 
one would not be able to transfer it to another platform without implicating the re-
production right. Many advocates and commentators have tried to use doctrines of 
fair use and implied licensure to cobble together a path through which owned digital 
media would be useful.155 The Ninth Circuit stated in dicta that moving a media file 
from one location to another, or “space-shifting,” for personal use should qualify as 
a fair use of a copyrighted work.156 But the status of space-shifting remains in legal 
limbo, in part because digital media sellers have not been inclined to litigate the po-
sition that space-shifting is illegal.157
Despite the puzzle surrounding ownership of digital files, it is possible to make 
some minimal claims of what this ownership must consist of. Take the case of an 
independent filmmaker who has completed a homemade documentary and who pur-
ports to sell a digital copy of the film to a viewer. The viewer downloads a copy onto 
the hard drive of his laptop computer. Everything about the transaction indicates that 
the filmmaker intended the viewer to be able to watch the film, not just passively 
keep the file. If you asked the filmmaker whether she wanted the viewer to see the 
film, she would clearly say, “Of course, that’s why I sold him the file.” Even though 
technically viewing the film would make a potentially infringing copy, it is plain that 
the filmmaker would have licensed the viewer to make the RAM reproductions nec-
essary to watch the movie. The case for an “implied license” to watch the film being 
present is overwhelming. 
But implied licensure doesn’t entirely clarify the notion of “selling a digital file.” 
Suppose the viewer in the story sells their laptop and every file on it, including the 
filmmaker’s documentary. Because he owns the file, he has a right to distribute his 
copy, and merely handing the laptop to another person does not implicate any of the 
                                                                                                                
155. See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Copyright Exhaustion and the Personal Use 
Dilemma, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2067, 2070 (2012) (“Courts and commentators have generally 
taken one of three approaches to justify personal uses: narrow interpretations of exclusive 
rights, fair use, and implied license. While each approach can resolve some aspects of the 
personal use dilemma, none are able to provide fully satisfying rationales or coherent doctrinal 
rules, and all three are limited in important respects and potentially vulnerable to erosion in 
the long term.”).
156. See Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 
1079 (9th Cir. 1999) ( “[A digital music player] makes copies in order to render portable, or 
‘space-shift,’ those files that already reside on a user’s hard drive. Such copying is paradig-
matic noncommercial personal use entirely consistent with the purposes of the Act.” (citing 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984)). 
157. Cf. Fred Von Lohmann, RIAA Says Ripping CDs to Your iPod Is Not Fair Use,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 15, 2006), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2006/02/riaa 
-says-ripping-cds-your-ipod-not-fair-use [https://perma.cc/Q7SK-ANUB]. 
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exclusive rights of copyright. But what happens to the filmmaker’s implied license 
to view the film? Would she have wanted the license to extend to a downstream buyer 
of the file? We can imagine that some “sellers” would want downstream owners of 
the file to be able to access it as well, but it also seems probable that many would not 
have wanted the implied license to extend to others besides the initial purchaser. A 
court might find that the implied license exists even over the objections of the copy-
right holder158 or that viewing the file would be fair use. But these findings are not 
at all guaranteed. In short, a sale coupled with implied licensure and the fair use 
doctrine does not necessarily create a kind of ownership akin to personal property 
law, which customers have come to expect and understand. 
Coming up with an understanding of what a digital sale means is a necessary pre-
requisite to digital sales being something that copyright holders can offer. If courts 
rule consistently, notions of fair use and implied license could create a viable frame-
work for “digital ownership” over time. More narrowly and immediately, if courts 
or Congress rejected the RAM copy doctrine, owned digital files would be initially 
usable, if not movable or easily transferrable. Section 117 could also be expanded to 
reach all copyrighted digital works, and not just computer programs. Another possi-
ble route is for courts or Congress to radically reevaluate what ownership means in 
a digital context, to focus on granting end users the functional equivalent of chattel 
ownership. This approach is exemplified in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) case 
UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle,159 in which the ECJ held that ownership of a particular 
copy of software extended to any “functional equivalent” of a tangible copy, includ-
ing altering the copy to update or patch it, or making a copy to transfer it to another 
purchaser so long as one made their own copy unusable.160  
3. Favoring Sales Without Losing Flexibility 
If courts begin to favor finding that EULAs transfer copies of works to end users, 
rather than licensing some uses to them indefinitely, a number of information-cost 
and waste-related issues will be mitigated. Purchasers will be more assured of their 
ability to make personal uses of works and their right to transfer their rights to others, 
without having to suffer high discovery and processing costs to understand the scope 
of their purchases’ EULAs. Moreover, viable copies and appliances won’t have to 
lie fallow because of improvident restraints on their alienation. 
But many EULAs offer licensees terms that permit uses beyond that which owners 
of copies possess, and some licensors would deem it very important to restrict licen-
sees to having fewer rights than copy ownership would provide. One might fairly 
wonder if a jurisprudence that favors finding copies are transferred to end users 
would unwisely inhibit licensors’ ability to craft extra permissions or restrictions. 
This section tries to articulate a workable balance between flexibility and standardi-
zation, proposing that, through a combination of offering additional license terms 
                                                                                                                
158. See, e.g., Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115–16 (D. Nev. 2006). 
159. Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. 407, http://eur
-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0128&from=EN [https:// 
perma.cc/2U88-R5Q9]. 
160. Id. ¶¶ 61, 63, 67, 70. 
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and terms that sound in contract, licensors can largely retain flexibility while guar-
anteeing a minimum set of rights for consumers. 
As a threshold matter, it’s important to note that even if a work is sold, further 
licenses to use a copyrighted work can always be granted. When discussing EULAs, 
this insight is easy to lose; several of the cases referenced above, including Augusto
and Vernor, grappled with whether a work had been licensed or sold. But it is also 
possible for works to be licensed and sold.161 In nondigital contexts, understanding 
these rights as separable does not seem difficult. I can sell or give you a copy of my 
book, and then grant you a license to make a derivative work of it, if you are a screen-
writer and we want to turn the book into a film. The license to do an activity that 
implicates one of the exclusive rights of copyright holders is entirely separate from 
the ownership of the book. If you knew the plot of the book, you could get a license 
to write the screenplay without owning a copy. Similarly, you could own a copy and 
have no rights to draft a derivative screenplay. Digitally, we could understand an 
analogous situation involving an end-user license agreement. An end user could be 
sold a copy of a digital media file and then also be given a license to publicly perform 
the work for a large audience. Put another way, owning a copy gives you rights to 
that copy—to distribute and display it—whereas licensure can give you the right to 
make more copies (or otherwise engage in the activities associated with copyright 
ownership).162
Recognizing that holding a license is not necessarily alternative to owning a copy 
sheds lights on two kinds of license agreements: the end-user license agreements we 
have been largely been discussing, and public licenses such as the General Public 
License (GPL)163 or Creative Commons licenses.164 When distributing a work under 
a public license, a copyright owner allows anyone to use the work according to the 
license terms. Typically, but not necessarily, public licenses allow licensees to share 
or distribute the licensed material under specific conditions. For example, the GPL 
and Artistic License for software allow anyone to make derivative works based on 
licensed works, so long as derivatives include access to the source code for the pro-
gram.165
Although EULAs and public licenses are both called “licenses,” their creators 
tend to have very different goals. Licensors offering EULAs tend to be concerned 
with how particular copies of their content are used but rarely permit their end users 
to alter the underlying work and distribute copies to new users. But licensors of pub-
licly licensed material are not nearly as concerned with how a particular user uses a 
                                                                                                                
161. See Carver, supra note 124, at 1930, 1934–37 (“One key to a proper resolution of the 
‘license versus sale’ question is a recognition that the two concepts are not mutually exclusive. 
Consequently, the entire framing of the question as one of ‘license versus sale’ presents a false 
dichotomy that should be avoided.”).
162. See id. at 1935–37; Mulligan, supra note 14, at 266 (discussing the rights to make 
copies and to use and convey particular copies).  
163. GNU General Public License Version 3, GNU OPERATING SYS. (June 29, 2007), 
https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html [https://perma.cc/R9Z9-3SRV]. 
164. CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org [https://perma.cc/XPN7-VPG2]. 
165. See, e.g., GNU OPERATING SYS., supra note 163, § 6; Artistic License 2.0, OPEN 
SOURCE INITIATIVE §§ 4–5, http://www.opensource.org/licenses/artistic-license-2.0 [https:// 
perma.cc/2B5B-Y4UN]. 
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particular copy and instead aim to create an environment where their work can be 
shared and used widely. Licensees of publicly licensed material are often granted not 
only the rights necessary to use a particular copy of the product themselves, indefi-
nitely, but also the rights to copy, distribute, and make derivative works of the li-
censed material under particular but broad conditions. 
Although both EULAs and public licenses are typically characterized as licenses 
and not sales, a better way to conceptualize their characters would be as documents 
that sell or transfer a copy, plus offer a license to engage in further behavior that 
implicates the exclusive rights of a copyright holder. In both cases, a copy of the 
“licensed” work is given to the licensee indefinitely and irrevocably: a hallmark of a 
sale or transfer of ownership for Carver, Perzanowski, and Schultz.166 And in both 
cases, additional license to engage in copyright-implicating behavior may be granted 
to the licensee. In the case of the end user, the additional license may be minimal, 
such as an allowance to make extra copies that increase the work’s usability to the 
end user. In the case of the licensee of the public license, the additional license may 
allow the licensee to alter and redistribute the work. Both types of “licenses” can be 
reframed as combinations of a sale and a license, which provide a “floor” of expected 
rights to the licensee or end user, plus additional permissions. 
A more challenging case involves how to approach a rights holder who wants to 
license use of a copy to an end user and heavily restrict how that copy is used. At 
present, courts tend to understand those efforts as creating a license and not a sale. 
But if, as suggested, courts evolve to find more “licenses” actually transfer title to 
copies of works, the question emerges how to handle further attempts to restrict how 
those sold works are used. One path would be, echoing the holding of Bobbs-Merrill 
Co. v. Straus167 and other first-sale cases, to hold that sellers simply could not place 
further limitations on the buyers of particular copies.168 This choice would maintain 
a clear floor of rights, which consumers could feel confident about exercising without 
having to read and understand the fine print of an EULA. Having considered the 
potential harms and inefficiencies of permitting EULAs to be infinitely malleable, 
the notion of a “rights floor” is appealing.
But we can also imagine that sometimes it might genuinely be desirable for a 
rights holder to limit how a copy of a work could be used. As a compromise in this 
case, we could understand such an agreement between seller and end user as taking 
a purer in personam form, only affecting the parties and avoiding increased infor-
mation costs for others. Thus, restrictive terms could be recognized as part of a con-
tract between seller and end user but would not run with the asset (i.e., would not 
attach to downstream owners of the copy). Violations of the restriction by the end 
user could also be penalized with contractual remedies rather than remedies for cop-
yright infringement. This notion of “selling a copy, and contracting for its limited 
use” could be compatible with existing law, and its theoretical underpinnings are 
explored in the following part. 
                                                                                                                
166. See supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text. 
167. 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
168. See, e.g., id. at 350; UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
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C. Distinguishing Between In Rem and In Personam License Terms 
Recognizing that EULAs are compound-paucital helps us understand how they 
can be best regulated and understood, but this recognition does not tell us how EULA 
violations should be remedied. This section addresses that problem by delving into 
the reasons for framing different rights and obligations in EULAs as property- or 
contract-like. 
One particularly vexing quality of licenses is that, even when they are clearly try-
ing to grant some set of rights, not every term of the license is necessarily specifying 
the scope of the property rights granted to the end user. For example, a licensee might 
have agreed to only use licensed software while wearing a red hat, to submit conflicts 
over the license terms to arbitration, or to write an online review of the content. 
Although part of the purported “license,” these terms are quite unrelated to the prop-
erty rights that the copyright owner has to transfer. The recent Ninth Circuit case 
MDY Industries, Inc. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.169 helped tease out the notion 
that some “license” terms delineated the scope of the property rights granted to the 
end user, while other terms were merely additional contract terms between the licen-
sor and licensee. In Blizzard, some World of Warcraft players were using a “bot” 
called Glider to aid their game play.170 Blizzard argued that the bot-using players 
were infringing on Blizzard’s copyrights when they used the bot because using bots 
was disallowed by Blizzard’s EULA.171
The Ninth Circuit rejected Blizzard’s characterization of the license agreement by 
distinguishing between terms of the license and terms of the contractual agreement 
between Blizzard and its players.172 Although the opinion slips between using prop-
erty and contract terms to describe the conditions of the license, the panel’s distinc-
tion is helpful to understanding how to separate terms of an agreement that sound in 
contract and copyright. The court explained, “We refer to contractual terms that limit 
a license’s scope as ‘conditions,’ the breach of which constitute copyright infringe-
ment. We refer to all other license terms as ‘covenants,’ the breach of which is ac-
tionable only under contract law.”173 The Blizzard court found that the term requiring 
players to avoid using bots was a contractual covenant—an agreement the players 
made with Blizzard separate from any grant of copyright rights—rather than a part 
of the license.174 In other words, Blizzard granted players the copyright permissions 
necessary to play the game, and then players contracted with Blizzard not to use a 
bot. By contrast, if the prohibition on bots would have been understood as part of the 
license, we might have counterfactually understood Blizzard’s license as constituting 
an idiosyncratic set of copyright rights—the copyright permissions necessary to play 
World of Warcraft without the use of bots.
The reasoning behind the Blizzard court’s characterization of the antibot term is 
worth meditating on. At first, the court seems to clearly distinguish between copy-
                                                                                                                
169. 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2011). 
170. Id. at 937–38.
171. Id. at 936. 
172. Id. at 939. 
173. Id. (citation omitted). 
174. Id. at 939–40.  
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right-implicating acts and other sorts of agreements. If a license states I have permis-
sion to make two copies of a work, and I make three, I have plainly exceeded the 
scope of the license and would be liable for copyright infringement. If a license in-
cludes a term saying that I promise to write and post an online review of the work, 
and I do not, I may have breached the contract, but I have not exceeded the scope of 
the license granted to me.  
But the court’s distinction between license conditions and contractual covenants 
is less clear when a non-copyright-related activity purports to set the license terms. 
Blizzard’s terms of use provide a useful example of these hard cases. Blizzard’s 
terms purport to grant a license to “use the Service solely for your own non-commer-
cial entertainment purposes by accessing it with an authorized, unmodified Game 
Client.”175 Although Blizzard employs the word “use” in this term, there is no general 
“exclusive right to use” a copyrighted work under federal copyright law.176 So, one 
can more precisely understand Blizzard as granting a license to engage in otherwise 
rights-infringing activities (such as reproducing Blizzard’s copyrighted works on 
one’s computer) when playing World of Warcraft for “non-commercial entertain-
ment purposes.”177 The terms then go on to specify that “[a]ny use of the Service or 
the Game Client in violation of the License Limitations will be regarded as an in-
fringement of Blizzard’s copyrights in and to the Game.”178 These limitations include 
a prohibition on using “cheats, automation software (bots), hacks, mods or any other 
unauthorized third-party software designed to modify the World of Warcraft experi-
ence.”179 Blizzard’s goal in drafting these terms is to render “not using bots” a con-
dition of the license. From Blizzard’s perspective, granting someone permission to 
reproduce Blizzard’s copyrighted works when not using a bot is the same as granting 
someone permission to make a copy two times and not three. They draft their terms 
to try to achieve this result as explicitly as possible. But the Ninth Circuit rejected 
that this could be a term of the license because “using a bot” did not implicate one of 
the § 106 rights.180 When one “uses a bot,” one does not make any more copies of 
the work than would have existed before; one does not publicly perform the work 
any more times. In the words of the court, there is no “nexus between the condition 
and the licensor’s exclusive rights of copyright.”181
The Blizzard court recognized the curious results that could come from treating 
non-copyright-related behaviors as exceeding the copyright license. It noted, “Were 
we to hold otherwise . . . any software copyright holder . . . could designate any dis-
favored conduct during software use as copyright infringement, by purporting to con-
dition the license on the player’s abstention from the disfavored conduct.”182  
Blizzard’s reasoning has significant implications. For instance, consider the pop-
ular “noncommercial use” term that appears in many software licenses and digital 
content licenses. Many commentators presume that these common terms sound in 
                                                                                                                
175. World of Warcraft Terms of Use, supra note 5, § 1. 
176. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
177. World of Warcraft Terms of Use, supra note 5, § 1. 
178. Id. § 2. 
179. Id.
180. MDY Indus., Inc. v. Blizzard Entm’t Inc, 629 F.3d 928, 944 (9th Cir. 2011). 
181. Id. at 941.
182. Id.
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property law. Both for-profit companies like Microsoft and public licensing groups 
like Creative Commons employ licensing terms that specify that the license only is 
granted for noncommercial uses of the licensor’s work. For-profit companies typi-
cally use these terms as tools to price discriminate.183 But, the holding of Blizzard
raises questions about the relative efficacy of noncommercial license agreements. If 
I have installed Excel on one of my computers at home, my use makes the same 
number of RAM copies and displays the same copyrighted images, regardless of 
whether I am using the program to keep track of my personal finances or my small 
business’s. Just like the World of Warcraft players using the Glider bot, my use of 
the program for one purpose rather than another does not directly implicate one of 
the copyright holder’s exclusive rights. Under Blizzard, it would seem the very com-
mon noncommercial license term often cannot sound in copyright, but rather must 
sound in contract law. In such a case, copyright holders would be limited to their 
actual damages—possibly the difference in price between a commercial and a non-
commercial copy of the software—rather than the statutory damages permitted in 
copyright law. 
But courts appear to disagree here. In the Federal Circuit decision Jacobsen v. 
Katzer,184 for instance, the court found that several terms in a publicly licensed work 
were enforceable copyright conditions, even though those terms did not directly im-
plicate copyright-infringing behavior.185 The district court had initially denied grant-
ing a preliminary injunction in favor of the copyright holder, reasoning that there was 
no likelihood of irreparable harm because the party would have violated a contractual 
agreement but not a copyright.186 But the Federal Circuit reversed. Explaining their 
decision, it reasoned that the terms about what materials to distribute along with the 
Artistic License were conditions of the license.187 Its reasoning appears to center on 
two elements: the fact that the Artistic License describes the distribution require-
ments as conditions of the license and the reality that public licensing would be less 
effective if the terms at the licenses’ core sounded in contract and not copyright.188
But neither of these reasons sufficiently explains why Jacobsen and Blizzard come 
out differently. In both cases, the copyright holders describe certain terms that don’t 
                                                                                                                
183. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV.
1799 (2000); John P. Conley & Christopher S. Yoo, Nonrivalry and Price Discrimination in 
Copyright Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1801 (2009); William W. Fisher III, When Should 
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184. 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
185. Id. at 1380, 1382–83.
186. Id. at 1376. 
187. Id. at 1381–82. 
188. See id. at 1381 (“The Artistic License states on its face that the document creates 
conditions . . . . These restrictions were both clear and necessary to accomplish the objectives 
of the open source licensing collaboration, including economic benefit.”).
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directly implicate the exclusive rights of copyright as conditions of the license. One 
explanation for the different holdings is that the two courts simply understood the 
possible scope of licensing law differently. Another explanation is a more realist one: 
a public licensor got more protection because public licenses are seen as beneficial 
and because framing the license terms as contractual would have likely rendered 
them effectively unenforceable, given the difficulty of making out a case for actual 
damages. A third possibility, and perhaps the best distinction, is that the terms in 
Jacobsen were appropriately understood as consideration for receiving the software 
in the first place, whereas the terms in Blizzard are not easily or realistically charac-
terized that way. Regardless of how courts draw the line between license and contract 
terms, the distinction has practical consequences. Licensors may have enormous dis-
cretion in how a copyrighted work can be used, but many limitations will and should 
only be enforced through contract law remedies. 
IV. LICENSE REVOCATION
While the previous Part has asked what licenses can do when they are granted, 
this Part explores when licenses can be revoked. As in the previous part, there are 
benefits to approaches that give licensors significant flexibility to revoke permissions 
and to approaches that restrict revocability in favor of protecting the interests of li-
censees. Revocable licenses are most beneficial in cases where licensors are manag-
ing a single resource shared among the licensees because the option to revoke a li-
cense allows the licensor to manage access to the resource in a way that maintains its 
usefulness for everyone. In contrast, irrevocable licenses best serve licensees’ inter-
ests when licensees need to rely on the licensed resource and when the licensed re-
source is an integral part of licensee’s self-conception. 
A. Timing Revocation 
The rights EULAs purport to grant can vary widely. Sometimes EULAs grant 
rights that are plainly irrevocable because the license agreement states this affirma-
tively. Sometimes use of works are not licensed, but rather copies are sold, and those 
sold copies can’t be taken back. Yet at other times, licensors purport to retain the 
ability to withdraw permissions granted in EULAs.  
At a minimum, licenses to use a copyrighted work transfer a “bare license,”189
unilaterally granted and revocable at the will of the rights holder,190 to use a work in 
                                                                                                                
189. License, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “bare license” as a li-
cense that is “revocable at will,” and “in which no property interest passes to the licensee, who 
is merely not a trespasser.”). For a discussion of why a license should be understood as grant-
ing, at a minimum, a bare license and should not be conceptualized as merely “a contract not 
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(2013). 
190. Newman, supra note 189, at 1158 (“[A] license is a property interest giving a non-
titleholder use-privileges to a licensed work. . . . Licenses are created simply by virtue of the 
licensor’s unilaterally manifested intent to permit use. . . . Licenses are presumptively revoca-
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the stated manner. Holders of a bare license have a privilege of using property in the 
granted way, and while a property owner can alter or revoke that privilege going 
forward, they may not change their minds and hold the bare licensee liable for tres-
pass or infringement for actions taken while the license was still in force.191 In this 
sense, granting a bare license to use the software copy could have no greater effect 
than granting someone permission to come to a party at your house.192 Just as you 
are free to revoke someone’s ability to drink tea on your porch for any reason or no 
reason, we could understand software licensors as granting permission to use their 
property and accept that this permission is revocable at will. 
Several licenses appear to be drafted with the goal of creating bare licenses. For 
example, in its terms of use for playing the massively multiplayer online game World 
of Warcraft, Blizzard Entertainment Company states that “Blizzard may suspend, 
terminate, modify, or delete any BNet account or World of Warcraft account at any 
time for any reason or for no reason, with or without notice to you.”193 Other terms 
of service, such as those for Linden Lab’s Second Life, are nominally narrower in 
scope but nonetheless purport to grant unreviewable discretion to a licensor over 
whether a licensee may continue to enjoy the licensed content: “Linden Lab may 
suspend or terminate your Account if you violate this Agreement . . . as determined 
by Linden Lab in its discretion.”194
A question surrounding bare-license-granting EULAs is what circumstances can 
trigger revocation. Reading Blizzard and Linden Lab’s licenses, one might imagine 
that Blizzard and Linden Lab would terminate the licenses by preventing users’ ac-
cess to the game or by sending a user an email informing them that their agreement 
with Linden or Blizzard had been terminated. But one could also maintain that the 
license is automatically revoked if the licensee engages in a proscribed activity. For 
example, the World of Warcraft terms of use specify to the licensee, “You agree that 
you will not . . . use cheats, automation software (bots), hacks, mods or any other 
unauthorized third-party software designed to modify the World of Warcraft experi-
ence,” or “use any unauthorized third-party software that intercepts, ‘mines,’ or oth-
erwise collects information from or through the Game or the Service . . . .”195 In MDY 
v. Blizzard, Blizzard maintained that World of Warcraft players were committing 
copyright infringement by using a bot called Glider to aid their game play.196 Blizzard 
argued, unsuccessfully, that players had exceeded the scope of the license agreement 
                                                                                                                
omitted)); id. at 1110 (“In copyright, as with tangible property, the creation of a bare license 
interest is not a matter of contract but a unilateral exercise of power by the copyright owner, 
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191. See id. at 1119 (“Property law . . . mak[es] license privileges revocable only prospec-
tively and . . . requir[es] that licensees be given a reasonable amount of time in which to extri-
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ers.”).
192. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 189. 
193. World of Warcraft Terms of Use, supra note 5, § 6.  
194. Terms of Service, LINDEN LAB, § 5.2, http://www.lindenlab.com/tos [https://perma 
.cc/XT4H-54FH]. 
195. World of Warcraft Terms of Use, supra note 5, § 2; see supra note 161 and accompa-
nying text. 
196. See MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 937–38 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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when using Glider.197 But Blizzard could have also argued that the moment someone 
used the Glider bot in violation of the license agreement, the license to use the World 
of Warcraft software was automatically revoked even though no one at Blizzard yet 
knew about the violation or had acted to revoke the license agreement. 
Some licenses purport to automatically terminate in more explicit terms. The ed-
ucational software company Articulate is one example. Its EULA provides, “This 
Agreement shall automatically terminate without further action by any party, imme-
diately upon any material breach by Licensee of any limitation or restriction set forth 
in” several sections of its agreement.198 Blizzard more cryptically provides, “Blizzard 
may suspend, terminate, modify, or delete any . . . World of Warcraft account at any 
time for any reason or for no reason, with or without notice to you,”199 apparently 
implying that Blizzard can choose to render anyone a license infringer at its whim 
without any warning to the user. 
Looking at these licenses from a property perspective suggests limits on when 
these termination clauses can activate. Under the common law, revocation of a bare 
license to use or access a piece of property requires giving the former licensee enough 
time to extricate themselves from the property.200 In the case of subjective license 
terms particularly, the licensee ought to be notified of the revocation before it can be 
effective.
B. Benefits and Concerns
1. Managing Shared Resources vs. Upset Reliance Interests 
Playing massive online games such as World of Warcraft and Second Life in-
volves an ongoing interaction with a community of players in an online environment 
that is roughly designed to look like a physical place. Thus, it is understandable that 
Blizzard and Linden Lab want to maintain absolute authority to decide who can in-
teract in that space and how. Similarly, it is also not surprising that Blizzard and 
Linden Lab’s terms of service activate Blackstonian-type instincts about property 
rights: it’s Blizzard’s and Linden Lab’s gaming environment; they should be able to 
choose who has access to their “despotic dominion.”201 In circumstances where many 
licensees must simultaneously participate in the licensors’ resources or interact with 
each other, revocable licenses are appealing because they allow licensors to manage 
                                                                                                                
197. See id. at 939–41. 
198. Articulate Global, Inc.—End-User License Agreement, ARTICULATE, https:// 
www.articulate.com/terms/end-user-license-agreement.php [https://perma.cc/L4GP-ZDS5];
cf. Kindle Store Terms of Use, supra note 1, § 3 (“Your rights under this Agreement will 
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199. World of Warcraft Terms of Use, supra note 5, § 6. 
200. Newman, supra note 189, at 1119 (“Property law . . . requir[es] that licensees be given 
a reasonable amount of time in which to extricate themselves . . . from a revoking licensor’s 
property before they can be treated as trespassers.”).
201. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *2. 
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their resources effectively. The circumstances where this interest is strongest are 
those where a licensor is managing many licensees’ access to one resource, such as 
a multiplayer video game or a subscription service where a user’s actions may strain 
the system and degrade the quality of other licensees’ experiences.
In analogous real property cases, property owners often attempt to grant bare li-
censes even when they also create a contractual obligation to allow licensees onto 
the property. The right to revoke licenses in these cases, despite possibly having to 
pay contractual damages later, helps prevent, in the words of Justice Holmes, some 
“obvious inconveniences.”202 Christopher Newman paints a picture of how being 
able to revoke licenses to enter land can prevent such inconvenience: 
A landowner who holds an event on her land to which members of the 
public are invited is taking on the burden of organizing and overseeing 
the activities of those persons in such a way as to maximize the success 
of the shared activity. Her right to admit or exclude individuals at will 
gives her the ability to manage the event; to prevent overcrowding and 
damage to the property; and to maintain order and safety by promulgat-
ing rules tailored to the nature of the event, the characteristics of the 
property, and the circumstances prevailing moment to moment. . . . If she 
[wrongfully excludes someone], she can be held accountable for this 
later, but in the meantime she will have the clear authority to manage the 
orderly use of resource in the moment.203
But not all end-user license agreements or terms of use involve management of 
shared resources. Many EULAs govern the use of specific pieces of copyrighted soft-
ware or content to be used indefinitely by a single purchaser. Other EULAs cover 
software in the objects that make up the growing Internet of Things, digital audio and 
video files, or software designed for use in a general-purpose computer. In many of 
these examples, a purchaser makes one payment in exchange for perpetual use and 
possession of the digital file or networked object.204 Here, the notion that a licensor 
may choose to revoke the license at any time, for any reason, seems intuitively less 
appropriate or desirable. The licensor’s interest in effectively managing a larger re-
source are absent, and the licensees’ interests would be better served by their acquir-
ing a more stable set of rights. End users often come to rely on the use of networked 
objects or digital works. Losing the ability to use a work or object abruptly and pos-
sibly without warning may cause an end user to suffer further harms and inconven-
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ience. For example, suppose an interior design firm purchased a piece of design soft-
ware for commercial purposes and used a digital camera to photograph spaces to 
design. Having the license to use the design software or camera software abruptly 
revoked by the licensee could significantly harm the firm’s business. Staff would 
have to be retrained on a new brand of design software, and someone would have to 
acquire a new camera. On a tight deadline, a firm’s ability to perform for clients as 
promised could be compromised, and providing contractual damages to the firm is 
hardly a satisfying solution. Part of the purpose of property law is to allow people to 
“incorporate resources into their long-term plans without fear of interference.”205
Many potential purchasers wouldn’t be interested in a product without the assurances 
that they would continue to be able to access it.206 Although terms that render a li-
cense defeasible—that is, subject to conditions, specified ex ante, that would termi-
nate the license or render it revocable207—may be marketable, terms that purport to 
allow a licensor the option to revoke the license at will would likely be significantly 
less desirable in the marketplace. 
Closely related to the concern about at-will revocation is a concern about licenses 
that purport to allow licensors to redraft them without notice to or agreement from 
licensees. For example, Kindle’s terms, which govern e-books that the end user may 
keep and use indefinitely, provide, “We may amend any of this Agreement’s terms at 
our sole discretion by posting the revised terms on the Amazon.com website.”208 The 
apparent appropriateness of this term changes based on whether we understand the 
rights Kindle grants its end users to be bare or irrevocable. If using a Kindle e-book 
that one has purchased is like going to a friend’s house for a dinner party or paying to 
go to a concert, then we might appreciate that it is appropriate for Amazon to have the 
right to change the terms under which you may continue to access the e-books, even 
after you have paid for the license. On the other hand, if licensing an e-book is more 
like acquiring an easement to lay cable wire or pipes, we might want to acknowledge 
the reliance interests the license holder has in their use of the licensed work. 
In terms of the interests of the licensor, it is worth noting that the case of an e-
book—a copy of a file that need not interact with the rest of the licensor’s works or 
with other licensees—is quite different from that of virtual worlds such as Second 
Life and World of Warcraft and from real-world establishments such as concerts, 
baseball stadia, and private homes. While participants in virtual worlds and other 
group endeavors will benefit from the owners of the game or property having the 
right to exclude players, these sorts of coordination benefits are not present in cases 
where individual copies of works are licensed to particular individuals who do not 
necessarily interact with other users of the property. One would thus hypothesize that 
                                                                                                                
205. Newman, supra note 189, at 1111. 
206. See id. at 1120 (“Before investing resources in a project whose ultimate value I can 
reap only through continued access to your property for two years, I will want some legal 
assurance that you will not revoke my license privileges before then.”); id. at 1147 (observing 
that those who wish to license works under open source licenses “have an interest in being 
able to grant irrevocable privileges because people are rightly wary of investing effort in using 
or modifying a work if the fruits of their investment are subject to arbitrary reassertion of 
copyright.”). 
207. Id. at 1120 (distinguishing between revocable and defeasible interests).  
208. Kindle Store Terms of Use, supra note 1, § 3.  
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the licensees of Kindle e-books would generally prefer to be able to rely on having 
continuing access to the books, and this interest would not be offset by an interest in 
the licensor needing to coordinate access to the property from moment to moment. 
Given anecdotal evidence, there is support for this hypothesis. In 2009, Amazon suf-
fered a small scandal concerning incorrectly licensed copies of the George Orwell 
novels 1984 and Animal Farm that had been sold through its Kindle store.209 Rather 
than just removing those editions from the Kindle store and preventing future pur-
chases, Amazon also remotely deleted existing, paid-for copies from its users’ Kindle 
devices.210 Although the irony of doing this with 1984 was initially lost on Amazon, 
the company later acknowledged that remote deletion had not been a good idea and 
pledged “in the future . . . not [to] remove books from customers’ devices in these 
circumstances.”211 Some readers expressed their frustration with Amazon in terms 
that could be characterized as reliance interests. For example, one seventeen-year-
old had been reading the book for a school summer assignment and lost the notes and 
annotations that he had written “on” the book in his Kindle. He remarked to the New 
York Times, “They didn’t just take a book back, they stole my work.”212 The outrage 
among Kindle users was understandable. Under Kindle’s terms of use that were in 
force at the time, end users acquired the right to keep a “permanent copy of the ap-
plicable digital content.”213 Although Amazon in theory never had the right to license 
those works to its users, the notion that it could delete already purchased books left 
many unsettled, largely because it would be unthinkable for a bookstore owner to
show up in your house and remove purchased books from your home.214 Regardless 
of the actual terms of the Kindle license, however, the end users’ reaction to their 
books’ deletion indicates that even for users’ making primarily personal uses of 
work, reliance interests and the expectation that works will remain accessible are 
present.  
A related reason that revocable licenses would sometimes be a poor fit for gov-
erning access to individual works is that their revocation directly conflicts with con-
sumer expectations. In Perzanowski and Hoofnagle’s survey, participants were given 
a hypothetical digital good to acquire and a button saying “Buy Now,” “License 
Now,” or specifying a short list of key license terms.215 Among participants who saw 
the “Buy Now” button, 87% believed they could keep the acquired e-book indefi-
nitely.216 Those faced with the pitch to “License Now” had similar expectations: 81% 
believed they could keep the e-book.217 Perzanowski and Hoofnagle’s findings indi-
cate that those who acquire digital files believe they are acquiring something that 
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cannot be revoked on a whim. Indeed, this belief is hardly irrational: even the Kindle 
Terms of Use indicate that end users may keep the Kindle content indefinitely.218  
2. Destabilizing Personhood
Striking a less concrete note is a second reason that revocable licenses should be 
avoided in cases where end users are granted use of particular, unshared works: los-
ing a license may create a harmful psychological experience for licensees. Margaret 
Radin explored this possibility in her article Property and Personhood,219 building 
off the work of Georg Hegel in Philosophy of Right.220 Radin considered what she 
deemed “personal property,” not to be conflated with tangible, chattel property (alt-
hough the term personal property is often used to describe chattel property as well). 
Radin’s “personal property” is to be contrasted with “fungible property.”221 Fungible 
property is property one does not have a personal attachment to. Most of the time, 
objects like plastic silverware, nuts, bolts, and nails are fungible property.222 If we 
lose one, an identically produced replacement completely suffices. Personal prop-
erty, on the other hand, has a personal connection to the owner that also helps the 
owner to create their own identity and sense of self.223 In Radin’s words, “Personal 
property is important precisely because its holder could not be the particular person 
she is without it.”224 One might similarly say that one’s relationships with personal 
property help one to self-actualize. Particular objects may be personal or fungible 
depending on the circumstances; in one example, Radin explains that a wedding ring 
may be fungible to a jeweler, but personal to the wearer who associates it with their 
personal relationships and identity.225 The importance of personal property is bound 
up in the idea that, to develop as human beings, we must be able to exert a degree of 
control over our external environment.226 Radin writes, “If an object you now control 
is bound up in your future plans or in your anticipation of your future self, and it is 
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partly these plans for your own continuity that make you a person, then your person-
hood depends on the realization of these expectations.”227 To a degree, it may sound 
like Radin is making an argument about reliance interests, but her focus is not on 
economic interests. Rather, it is on deeply personal ones. 
Even if one subscribes to Radin’s theory of property and personhood, one might 
still wonder whether digital files and networked appliances qualify as the kind of 
personal, as opposed to fungible, property that gives rise to the kind of interest that 
at-will license revocation could undercut. In isolation, it might be appealing to see 
most files and devices as fungible. But in the aggregate, lack of control and stability 
over the balance of objects in one’s life—the kind of control over one’s external 
environment which Radin discusses—can be deeply emotionally destabilizing and, 
perhaps, do damage to one’s sense of self even though no individual object is partic-
ularly personal. The experience of moving homes or having to sell and replace many 
of one’s possessions brings this phenomenon to light. Each chair, table, and decora-
tion may not be particularly meaningful in isolation, but together they create the tab-
leau of one’s home, a core expression of one’s personal identity. If one has ever had 
to move across the country or internationally, one quickly realizes the experience of 
changing every part of one’s home environment creates a degree of emotional dis-
cord. Often this experience is a feature not a bug: sometimes when people move a 
long distance, a reason is that they want to grow into a new, better, and different 
person, or to “start a new life.” The instability is part of recreating one’s self. But in 
circumstances where the change is involuntary, losing the experience of one’s home 
can be genuinely painful. Just as believing you might be evicted from your home at 
any moment, the prospect that one could lose access to the information goods and 
networked objects in one’s life may create a similar type of stress, particularly as 
computers become more commonplace and integrated into one’s everyday life. 
CONCLUSION
EULAs exist on the property/contract interface, creating rights and obligations 
whose natures blend in rem and in personam characteristics. Their hybrid status in-
dicates that EULAs will be most economically efficient and socially beneficial when 
they are less standardized than property interests and less flexible than contract in-
terests can be. Practically speaking, more effective EULA regulation can be achieved 
by providing better notice to licensees about the content of licenses and by creating 
substantive legal protections for licensees. Possible protective measures involve reg-
ulating how courts and other legal actors should approach use-restrictive license 
terms and revocable licenses.  
Regarding usage restrictions, courts should be skeptical of EULA terms that grant 
narrow, nontransferrable, or idiosyncratic intellectual-property rights to use particu-
lar copies of a work because of the information costs and confusion these rights cre-
ate for end users and the waste of resources that enforcing the terms will ensure. 
Rather, licenses to particular copies of a work should be understood, when possible, 
to transfer title to a copy of the work to the end user, and to then impose additional 
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limitations on use by contract or create additional intellectual property rights through 
licensure. 
Turning to revocation, where reliance or personality interests in using a work are 
significant, terms should be read as granting more than a bare license to use a licensed 
work. However, license terms may beneficially be read as granting bare licenses 
when the license governs access to a shared resource. Regardless of type, licensees 
should be notified if their license to use a work is revoked before they can be held 
liable for copyright infringement. 
But these specific suggestions pale in comparison to the larger conclusion of this 
Article, that there are structural reasons to believe that EULAs will neither be just 
nor economically efficient so long as their terms are enforced as though they are 
contractual, while their violations are punished with supercompensatory and injunc-
tive property remedies. While the best corrective protections may vary as the subjects 
of EULAs change, legislators and judges should take actions recognizing that licen-
sors, licensees, and third parties can be better off if we craft the law of EULAs in 
light of their position on the property/contract interface. 
